[PATCH 2/6] staging: rtl8723bs: Fix potential security hole

[Larry Finger]

In routine rtw_hostapd_ioctl(), the user-controlled p->length is assumed
to be at least the size of struct ieee_param size, but this assumption is
never checked. This could result in out-of-bounds read/write on kernel
heap in case a p->length less than the size of struct ieee_param is
specified by the user. If p->length is allowed to be greater than the size
of the struct, then a malicious user could be wasting kernel memory.
Fixes commit 554c0a3abf216 ("0taging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver").

Reported by: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva at gmail.com>
Cc: Pietro Oliva <pietroliva at gmail.com>
Cc: Stable <stable at vger.kernel.org>
Fixes 554c0a3abf216 ("0taging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver").
Signed-off-by: Larry Finger <Larry.Finger at lwfinger.net>
---
 drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
index db6528a01229..3128766dd50e 100644
--- a/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
+++ b/drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/os_dep/ioctl_linux.c
@@ -4207,7 +4207,7 @@ static int rtw_hostapd_ioctl(struct net_device *dev, struct iw_point *p)
 
 
 	/* if (p->length < sizeof(struct ieee_param) || !p->pointer) { */
-	if (!p->pointer) {
+	if (!p->pointer || p->length != sizeof(*param)) {
 		ret = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
 	}
-- 
2.25.0