[PATCH 5/7] crypto: ccree: add AEAD support

Gilad Ben-Yossef gilad at benyossef.com
Thu Jan 11 09:17:12 UTC 2018


Add CryptoCell AEAD support

Signed-off-by: Gilad Ben-Yossef <gilad at benyossef.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/ccree/Makefile        |    2 +-
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c       | 2702 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.h       |  109 ++
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c |  882 +++++++++++
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.h |    4 +
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_driver.c     |   10 +
 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_driver.h     |    4 +
 7 files changed, 3712 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c
 create mode 100644 drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.h

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/Makefile b/drivers/crypto/ccree/Makefile
index 1109480..7cb3082 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/Makefile
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/Makefile
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 
 obj-$(CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_CCREE) := ccree.o
-ccree-y := cc_driver.o cc_buffer_mgr.o cc_request_mgr.o cc_cipher.o cc_hash.o cc_ivgen.o cc_sram_mgr.o
+ccree-y := cc_driver.o cc_buffer_mgr.o cc_request_mgr.o cc_cipher.o cc_hash.o cc_aead.o cc_ivgen.o cc_sram_mgr.o
 ccree-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_FS) += cc_debugfs.o
 ccree-$(CONFIG_PM) += cc_pm.o
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..265adff
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2702 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (C) 2012-2018 ARM Limited or its affiliates. */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
+#include <crypto/authenc.h>
+#include <crypto/des.h>
+#include <linux/rtnetlink.h>
+#include "cc_driver.h"
+#include "cc_buffer_mgr.h"
+#include "cc_aead.h"
+#include "cc_request_mgr.h"
+#include "cc_hash.h"
+#include "cc_sram_mgr.h"
+
+#define template_aead	template_u.aead
+
+#define MAX_AEAD_SETKEY_SEQ 12
+#define MAX_AEAD_PROCESS_SEQ 23
+
+#define MAX_HMAC_DIGEST_SIZE (SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE)
+#define MAX_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE (SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE)
+
+#define AES_CCM_RFC4309_NONCE_SIZE 3
+#define MAX_NONCE_SIZE CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE
+
+/* Value of each ICV_CMP byte (of 8) in case of success */
+#define ICV_VERIF_OK 0x01
+
+struct cc_aead_handle {
+	cc_sram_addr_t sram_workspace_addr;
+	struct list_head aead_list;
+};
+
+struct cc_hmac_s {
+	u8 *padded_authkey;
+	u8 *ipad_opad; /* IPAD, OPAD*/
+	dma_addr_t padded_authkey_dma_addr;
+	dma_addr_t ipad_opad_dma_addr;
+};
+
+struct cc_xcbc_s {
+	u8 *xcbc_keys; /* K1,K2,K3 */
+	dma_addr_t xcbc_keys_dma_addr;
+};
+
+struct cc_aead_ctx {
+	struct cc_drvdata *drvdata;
+	u8 ctr_nonce[MAX_NONCE_SIZE]; /* used for ctr3686 iv and aes ccm */
+	u8 *enckey;
+	dma_addr_t enckey_dma_addr;
+	union {
+		struct cc_hmac_s hmac;
+		struct cc_xcbc_s xcbc;
+	} auth_state;
+	unsigned int enc_keylen;
+	unsigned int auth_keylen;
+	unsigned int authsize; /* Actual (reduced?) size of the MAC/ICv */
+	enum drv_cipher_mode cipher_mode;
+	enum cc_flow_mode flow_mode;
+	enum drv_hash_mode auth_mode;
+};
+
+static inline bool valid_assoclen(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	return ((req->assoclen == 16) || (req->assoclen == 20));
+}
+
+static void cc_aead_exit(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+
+	dev_dbg(dev, "Clearing context @%p for %s\n", crypto_aead_ctx(tfm),
+		crypto_tfm_alg_name(&tfm->base));
+
+	/* Unmap enckey buffer */
+	if (ctx->enckey) {
+		dma_free_coherent(dev, AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE, ctx->enckey,
+				  ctx->enckey_dma_addr);
+		dev_dbg(dev, "Freed enckey DMA buffer enckey_dma_addr=%pad\n",
+			&ctx->enckey_dma_addr);
+		ctx->enckey_dma_addr = 0;
+		ctx->enckey = NULL;
+	}
+
+	if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC) { /* XCBC authetication */
+		struct cc_xcbc_s *xcbc = &ctx->auth_state.xcbc;
+
+		if (xcbc->xcbc_keys) {
+			dma_free_coherent(dev, CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE * 3,
+					  xcbc->xcbc_keys,
+					  xcbc->xcbc_keys_dma_addr);
+		}
+		dev_dbg(dev, "Freed xcbc_keys DMA buffer xcbc_keys_dma_addr=%pad\n",
+			&xcbc->xcbc_keys_dma_addr);
+		xcbc->xcbc_keys_dma_addr = 0;
+		xcbc->xcbc_keys = NULL;
+	} else if (ctx->auth_mode != DRV_HASH_NULL) { /* HMAC auth. */
+		struct cc_hmac_s *hmac = &ctx->auth_state.hmac;
+
+		if (hmac->ipad_opad) {
+			dma_free_coherent(dev, 2 * MAX_HMAC_DIGEST_SIZE,
+					  hmac->ipad_opad,
+					  hmac->ipad_opad_dma_addr);
+			dev_dbg(dev, "Freed ipad_opad DMA buffer ipad_opad_dma_addr=%pad\n",
+				&hmac->ipad_opad_dma_addr);
+			hmac->ipad_opad_dma_addr = 0;
+			hmac->ipad_opad = NULL;
+		}
+		if (hmac->padded_authkey) {
+			dma_free_coherent(dev, MAX_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE,
+					  hmac->padded_authkey,
+					  hmac->padded_authkey_dma_addr);
+			dev_dbg(dev, "Freed padded_authkey DMA buffer padded_authkey_dma_addr=%pad\n",
+				&hmac->padded_authkey_dma_addr);
+			hmac->padded_authkey_dma_addr = 0;
+			hmac->padded_authkey = NULL;
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+static int cc_aead_init(struct crypto_aead *tfm)
+{
+	struct aead_alg *alg = crypto_aead_alg(tfm);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct cc_crypto_alg *cc_alg =
+			container_of(alg, struct cc_crypto_alg, aead_alg);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(cc_alg->drvdata);
+
+	dev_dbg(dev, "Initializing context @%p for %s\n", ctx,
+		crypto_tfm_alg_name(&tfm->base));
+
+	/* Initialize modes in instance */
+	ctx->cipher_mode = cc_alg->cipher_mode;
+	ctx->flow_mode = cc_alg->flow_mode;
+	ctx->auth_mode = cc_alg->auth_mode;
+	ctx->drvdata = cc_alg->drvdata;
+	crypto_aead_set_reqsize(tfm, sizeof(struct aead_req_ctx));
+
+	/* Allocate key buffer, cache line aligned */
+	ctx->enckey = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
+					 &ctx->enckey_dma_addr, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!ctx->enckey) {
+		dev_err(dev, "Failed allocating key buffer\n");
+		goto init_failed;
+	}
+	dev_dbg(dev, "Allocated enckey buffer in context ctx->enckey=@%p\n",
+		ctx->enckey);
+
+	/* Set default authlen value */
+
+	if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC) { /* XCBC authetication */
+		struct cc_xcbc_s *xcbc = &ctx->auth_state.xcbc;
+		const unsigned int key_size = CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE * 3;
+
+		/* Allocate dma-coherent buffer for XCBC's K1+K2+K3 */
+		/* (and temporary for user key - up to 256b) */
+		xcbc->xcbc_keys = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, key_size,
+						     &xcbc->xcbc_keys_dma_addr,
+						     GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (!xcbc->xcbc_keys) {
+			dev_err(dev, "Failed allocating buffer for XCBC keys\n");
+			goto init_failed;
+		}
+	} else if (ctx->auth_mode != DRV_HASH_NULL) { /* HMAC authentication */
+		struct cc_hmac_s *hmac = &ctx->auth_state.hmac;
+		const unsigned int digest_size = 2 * MAX_HMAC_DIGEST_SIZE;
+		dma_addr_t *pkey_dma = &hmac->padded_authkey_dma_addr;
+
+		/* Allocate dma-coherent buffer for IPAD + OPAD */
+		hmac->ipad_opad = dma_alloc_coherent(dev, digest_size,
+						     &hmac->ipad_opad_dma_addr,
+						     GFP_KERNEL);
+
+		if (!hmac->ipad_opad) {
+			dev_err(dev, "Failed allocating IPAD/OPAD buffer\n");
+			goto init_failed;
+		}
+
+		dev_dbg(dev, "Allocated authkey buffer in context ctx->authkey=@%p\n",
+			hmac->ipad_opad);
+
+		hmac->padded_authkey = dma_alloc_coherent(dev,
+							  MAX_HMAC_BLOCK_SIZE,
+							  pkey_dma,
+							  GFP_KERNEL);
+
+		if (!hmac->padded_authkey) {
+			dev_err(dev, "failed to allocate padded_authkey\n");
+			goto init_failed;
+		}
+	} else {
+		ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad = NULL;
+		ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+init_failed:
+	cc_aead_exit(tfm);
+	return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+static void cc_aead_complete(struct device *dev, void *cc_req, int err)
+{
+	struct aead_request *areq = (struct aead_request *)cc_req;
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(areq);
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(cc_req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	cc_unmap_aead_request(dev, areq);
+
+	/* Restore ordinary iv pointer */
+	areq->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
+
+	if (err)
+		goto done;
+
+	if (areq_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) {
+		if (memcmp(areq_ctx->mac_buf, areq_ctx->icv_virt_addr,
+			   ctx->authsize) != 0) {
+			dev_dbg(dev, "Payload authentication failure, (auth-size=%d, cipher=%d)\n",
+				ctx->authsize, ctx->cipher_mode);
+			/* In case of payload authentication failure, MUST NOT
+			 * revealed the decrypted message --> zero its memory.
+			 */
+			cc_zero_sgl(areq->dst, areq_ctx->cryptlen);
+			err = -EBADMSG;
+		}
+	} else { /*ENCRYPT*/
+		if (areq_ctx->is_icv_fragmented) {
+			u32 skip = areq->cryptlen + areq_ctx->dst_offset;
+
+			cc_copy_sg_portion(dev, areq_ctx->mac_buf,
+					   areq_ctx->dst_sgl, skip,
+					   (skip + ctx->authsize),
+					   CC_SG_FROM_BUF);
+		}
+
+		/* If an IV was generated, copy it back to the user provided
+		 * buffer.
+		 */
+		if (areq_ctx->backup_giv) {
+			if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CTR)
+				memcpy(areq_ctx->backup_giv, areq_ctx->ctr_iv +
+				       CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE,
+				       CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE);
+			else if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM)
+				memcpy(areq_ctx->backup_giv, areq_ctx->ctr_iv +
+				       CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET, CCM_BLOCK_IV_SIZE);
+		}
+	}
+done:
+	aead_request_complete(areq, err);
+}
+
+static int xcbc_setkey(struct cc_hw_desc *desc, struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	/* Load the AES key */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[0]);
+	/* We are using for the source/user key the same buffer
+	 * as for the output keys, * because after this key loading it
+	 * is not needed anymore
+	 */
+	set_din_type(&desc[0], DMA_DLLI,
+		     ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr, ctx->auth_keylen,
+		     NS_BIT);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[0], DRV_CIPHER_ECB);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[0], DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
+	set_key_size_aes(&desc[0], ctx->auth_keylen);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[0], S_DIN_to_AES);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[0], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
+
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[1]);
+	set_din_const(&desc[1], 0x01010101, CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[1], DIN_AES_DOUT);
+	set_dout_dlli(&desc[1], ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr,
+		      AES_KEYSIZE_128, NS_BIT, 0);
+
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[2]);
+	set_din_const(&desc[2], 0x02020202, CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[2], DIN_AES_DOUT);
+	set_dout_dlli(&desc[2], (ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr
+					 + AES_KEYSIZE_128),
+			      AES_KEYSIZE_128, NS_BIT, 0);
+
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[3]);
+	set_din_const(&desc[3], 0x03030303, CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[3], DIN_AES_DOUT);
+	set_dout_dlli(&desc[3], (ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr
+					  + 2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128),
+			      AES_KEYSIZE_128, NS_BIT, 0);
+
+	return 4;
+}
+
+static int hmac_setkey(struct cc_hw_desc *desc, struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	unsigned int hmac_pad_const[2] = { HMAC_IPAD_CONST, HMAC_OPAD_CONST };
+	unsigned int digest_ofs = 0;
+	unsigned int hash_mode = (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_SHA1) ?
+			DRV_HASH_HW_SHA1 : DRV_HASH_HW_SHA256;
+	unsigned int digest_size = (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_SHA1) ?
+			CC_SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE : CC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	struct cc_hmac_s *hmac = &ctx->auth_state.hmac;
+
+	int idx = 0;
+	int i;
+
+	/* calc derived HMAC key */
+	for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+		/* Load hash initial state */
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
+		set_din_sram(&desc[idx],
+			     cc_larval_digest_addr(ctx->drvdata,
+						   ctx->auth_mode),
+			     digest_size);
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+		set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE0);
+		idx++;
+
+		/* Load the hash current length*/
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
+		set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0, HASH_LEN_SIZE);
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+		set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
+		idx++;
+
+		/* Prepare ipad key */
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_xor_val(&desc[idx], hmac_pad_const[i]);
+		set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+		set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE1);
+		idx++;
+
+		/* Perform HASH update */
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
+			     hmac->padded_authkey_dma_addr,
+			     SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE, NS_BIT);
+		set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
+		set_xor_active(&desc[idx]);
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_HASH);
+		idx++;
+
+		/* Get the digset */
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
+		set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx],
+			      (hmac->ipad_opad_dma_addr + digest_ofs),
+			      digest_size, NS_BIT, 0);
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_HASH_to_DOUT);
+		set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_WRITE_STATE0);
+		set_cipher_config1(&desc[idx], HASH_PADDING_DISABLED);
+		idx++;
+
+		digest_ofs += digest_size;
+	}
+
+	return idx;
+}
+
+static int validate_keys_sizes(struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx)
+{
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+
+	dev_dbg(dev, "enc_keylen=%u  authkeylen=%u\n",
+		ctx->enc_keylen, ctx->auth_keylen);
+
+	switch (ctx->auth_mode) {
+	case DRV_HASH_SHA1:
+	case DRV_HASH_SHA256:
+		break;
+	case DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC:
+		if (ctx->auth_keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
+		    ctx->auth_keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
+		    ctx->auth_keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256)
+			return -ENOTSUPP;
+		break;
+	case DRV_HASH_NULL: /* Not authenc (e.g., CCM) - no auth_key) */
+		if (ctx->auth_keylen > 0)
+			return -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	default:
+		dev_err(dev, "Invalid auth_mode=%d\n", ctx->auth_mode);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	/* Check cipher key size */
+	if (ctx->flow_mode == S_DIN_to_DES) {
+		if (ctx->enc_keylen != DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE) {
+			dev_err(dev, "Invalid cipher(3DES) key size: %u\n",
+				ctx->enc_keylen);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	} else { /* Default assumed to be AES ciphers */
+		if (ctx->enc_keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
+		    ctx->enc_keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_192 &&
+		    ctx->enc_keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256) {
+			dev_err(dev, "Invalid cipher(AES) key size: %u\n",
+				ctx->enc_keylen);
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0; /* All tests of keys sizes passed */
+}
+
+/* This function prepers the user key so it can pass to the hmac processing
+ * (copy to intenral buffer or hash in case of key longer than block
+ */
+static int
+cc_get_plain_hmac_key(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+		      unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	dma_addr_t key_dma_addr = 0;
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+	u32 larval_addr = cc_larval_digest_addr(ctx->drvdata, ctx->auth_mode);
+	struct cc_crypto_req cc_req = {};
+	unsigned int blocksize;
+	unsigned int digestsize;
+	unsigned int hashmode;
+	unsigned int idx = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct cc_hw_desc desc[MAX_AEAD_SETKEY_SEQ];
+	dma_addr_t padded_authkey_dma_addr =
+		ctx->auth_state.hmac.padded_authkey_dma_addr;
+
+	switch (ctx->auth_mode) { /* auth_key required and >0 */
+	case DRV_HASH_SHA1:
+		blocksize = SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		digestsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+		hashmode = DRV_HASH_HW_SHA1;
+		break;
+	case DRV_HASH_SHA256:
+	default:
+		blocksize = SHA256_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		digestsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+		hashmode = DRV_HASH_HW_SHA256;
+	}
+
+	if (keylen != 0) {
+		key_dma_addr = dma_map_single(dev, (void *)key, keylen,
+					      DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+		if (dma_mapping_error(dev, key_dma_addr)) {
+			dev_err(dev, "Mapping key va=0x%p len=%u for DMA failed\n",
+				key, keylen);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+		}
+		if (keylen > blocksize) {
+			/* Load hash initial state */
+			hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+			set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hashmode);
+			set_din_sram(&desc[idx], larval_addr, digestsize);
+			set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+			set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE0);
+			idx++;
+
+			/* Load the hash current length*/
+			hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+			set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hashmode);
+			set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0, HASH_LEN_SIZE);
+			set_cipher_config1(&desc[idx], HASH_PADDING_ENABLED);
+			set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+			set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
+			idx++;
+
+			hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+			set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
+				     key_dma_addr, keylen, NS_BIT);
+			set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_HASH);
+			idx++;
+
+			/* Get hashed key */
+			hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+			set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hashmode);
+			set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], padded_authkey_dma_addr,
+				      digestsize, NS_BIT, 0);
+			set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_HASH_to_DOUT);
+			set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_WRITE_STATE0);
+			set_cipher_config1(&desc[idx], HASH_PADDING_DISABLED);
+			set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx],
+					   HASH_DIGEST_RESULT_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+			idx++;
+
+			hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+			set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0, (blocksize - digestsize));
+			set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], BYPASS);
+			set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], (padded_authkey_dma_addr +
+				      digestsize), (blocksize - digestsize),
+				      NS_BIT, 0);
+			idx++;
+		} else {
+			hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+			set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, key_dma_addr,
+				     keylen, NS_BIT);
+			set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], BYPASS);
+			set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], padded_authkey_dma_addr,
+				      keylen, NS_BIT, 0);
+			idx++;
+
+			if ((blocksize - keylen) != 0) {
+				hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+				set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0,
+					      (blocksize - keylen));
+				set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], BYPASS);
+				set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx],
+					      (padded_authkey_dma_addr +
+					       keylen),
+					      (blocksize - keylen), NS_BIT, 0);
+				idx++;
+			}
+		}
+	} else {
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0, (blocksize - keylen));
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], BYPASS);
+		set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], padded_authkey_dma_addr,
+			      blocksize, NS_BIT, 0);
+		idx++;
+	}
+
+	rc = cc_send_sync_request(ctx->drvdata, &cc_req, desc, idx);
+	if (rc)
+		dev_err(dev, "send_request() failed (rc=%d)\n", rc);
+
+	if (key_dma_addr)
+		dma_unmap_single(dev, key_dma_addr, keylen, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int
+cc_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct rtattr *rta = (struct rtattr *)key;
+	struct cc_crypto_req cc_req = {};
+	struct crypto_authenc_key_param *param;
+	struct cc_hw_desc desc[MAX_AEAD_SETKEY_SEQ];
+	int seq_len = 0, rc = -EINVAL;
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+
+	dev_dbg(dev, "Setting key in context @%p for %s. key=%p keylen=%u\n",
+		ctx, crypto_tfm_alg_name(crypto_aead_tfm(tfm)), key, keylen);
+
+	/* STAT_PHASE_0: Init and sanity checks */
+
+	if (ctx->auth_mode != DRV_HASH_NULL) { /* authenc() alg. */
+		if (!RTA_OK(rta, keylen))
+			goto badkey;
+		if (rta->rta_type != CRYPTO_AUTHENC_KEYA_PARAM)
+			goto badkey;
+		if (RTA_PAYLOAD(rta) < sizeof(*param))
+			goto badkey;
+		param = RTA_DATA(rta);
+		ctx->enc_keylen = be32_to_cpu(param->enckeylen);
+		key += RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
+		keylen -= RTA_ALIGN(rta->rta_len);
+		if (keylen < ctx->enc_keylen)
+			goto badkey;
+		ctx->auth_keylen = keylen - ctx->enc_keylen;
+
+		if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CTR) {
+			/* the nonce is stored in bytes at end of key */
+			if (ctx->enc_keylen <
+			    (AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE))
+				goto badkey;
+			/* Copy nonce from last 4 bytes in CTR key to
+			 *  first 4 bytes in CTR IV
+			 */
+			memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, key + ctx->auth_keylen +
+			       ctx->enc_keylen - CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE,
+			       CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
+			/* Set CTR key size */
+			ctx->enc_keylen -= CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE;
+		}
+	} else { /* non-authenc - has just one key */
+		ctx->enc_keylen = keylen;
+		ctx->auth_keylen = 0;
+	}
+
+	rc = validate_keys_sizes(ctx);
+	if (rc)
+		goto badkey;
+
+	/* STAT_PHASE_1: Copy key to ctx */
+
+	/* Get key material */
+	memcpy(ctx->enckey, key + ctx->auth_keylen, ctx->enc_keylen);
+	if (ctx->enc_keylen == 24)
+		memset(ctx->enckey + 24, 0, CC_AES_KEY_SIZE_MAX - 24);
+	if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC) {
+		memcpy(ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys, key, ctx->auth_keylen);
+	} else if (ctx->auth_mode != DRV_HASH_NULL) { /* HMAC */
+		rc = cc_get_plain_hmac_key(tfm, key, ctx->auth_keylen);
+		if (rc)
+			goto badkey;
+	}
+
+	/* STAT_PHASE_2: Create sequence */
+
+	switch (ctx->auth_mode) {
+	case DRV_HASH_SHA1:
+	case DRV_HASH_SHA256:
+		seq_len = hmac_setkey(desc, ctx);
+		break;
+	case DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC:
+		seq_len = xcbc_setkey(desc, ctx);
+		break;
+	case DRV_HASH_NULL: /* non-authenc modes, e.g., CCM */
+		break; /* No auth. key setup */
+	default:
+		dev_err(dev, "Unsupported authenc (%d)\n", ctx->auth_mode);
+		rc = -ENOTSUPP;
+		goto badkey;
+	}
+
+	/* STAT_PHASE_3: Submit sequence to HW */
+
+	if (seq_len > 0) { /* For CCM there is no sequence to setup the key */
+		rc = cc_send_sync_request(ctx->drvdata, &cc_req, desc, seq_len);
+		if (rc) {
+			dev_err(dev, "send_request() failed (rc=%d)\n", rc);
+			goto setkey_error;
+		}
+	}
+
+	/* Update STAT_PHASE_3 */
+	return rc;
+
+badkey:
+	crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_KEY_LEN);
+
+setkey_error:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int cc_rfc4309_ccm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+				 unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+
+	if (keylen < 3)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	keylen -= 3;
+	memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, key + keylen, 3);
+
+	return cc_aead_setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
+}
+
+static int cc_aead_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
+			       unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+
+	/* Unsupported auth. sizes */
+	if (authsize == 0 ||
+	    authsize > crypto_aead_maxauthsize(authenc)) {
+		return -ENOTSUPP;
+	}
+
+	ctx->authsize = authsize;
+	dev_dbg(dev, "authlen=%d\n", ctx->authsize);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cc_rfc4309_ccm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
+				      unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	switch (authsize) {
+	case 8:
+	case 12:
+	case 16:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return cc_aead_setauthsize(authenc, authsize);
+}
+
+static int cc_ccm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
+			      unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	switch (authsize) {
+	case 4:
+	case 6:
+	case 8:
+	case 10:
+	case 12:
+	case 14:
+	case 16:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return cc_aead_setauthsize(authenc, authsize);
+}
+
+static void cc_set_assoc_desc(struct aead_request *areq, unsigned int flow_mode,
+			      struct cc_hw_desc desc[], unsigned int *seq_size)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(areq);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(areq);
+	enum cc_req_dma_buf_type assoc_dma_type = areq_ctx->assoc_buff_type;
+	unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+
+	switch (assoc_dma_type) {
+	case CC_DMA_BUF_DLLI:
+		dev_dbg(dev, "ASSOC buffer type DLLI\n");
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, sg_dma_address(areq->src),
+			     areq->assoclen, NS_BIT);
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], flow_mode);
+		if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC &&
+		    areq_ctx->cryptlen > 0)
+			set_din_not_last_indication(&desc[idx]);
+		break;
+	case CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI:
+		dev_dbg(dev, "ASSOC buffer type MLLI\n");
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_MLLI, areq_ctx->assoc.sram_addr,
+			     areq_ctx->assoc.mlli_nents, NS_BIT);
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], flow_mode);
+		if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC &&
+		    areq_ctx->cryptlen > 0)
+			set_din_not_last_indication(&desc[idx]);
+		break;
+	case CC_DMA_BUF_NULL:
+	default:
+		dev_err(dev, "Invalid ASSOC buffer type\n");
+	}
+
+	*seq_size = (++idx);
+}
+
+static void cc_proc_authen_desc(struct aead_request *areq,
+				unsigned int flow_mode,
+				struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
+				unsigned int *seq_size, int direct)
+{
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(areq);
+	enum cc_req_dma_buf_type data_dma_type = areq_ctx->data_buff_type;
+	unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(areq);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+
+	switch (data_dma_type) {
+	case CC_DMA_BUF_DLLI:
+	{
+		struct scatterlist *cipher =
+			(direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ?
+			areq_ctx->dst_sgl : areq_ctx->src_sgl;
+
+		unsigned int offset =
+			(direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ?
+			areq_ctx->dst_offset : areq_ctx->src_offset;
+		dev_dbg(dev, "AUTHENC: SRC/DST buffer type DLLI\n");
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
+			     (sg_dma_address(cipher) + offset),
+			     areq_ctx->cryptlen, NS_BIT);
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], flow_mode);
+		break;
+	}
+	case CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI:
+	{
+		/* DOUBLE-PASS flow (as default)
+		 * assoc. + iv + data -compact in one table
+		 * if assoclen is ZERO only IV perform
+		 */
+		cc_sram_addr_t mlli_addr = areq_ctx->assoc.sram_addr;
+		u32 mlli_nents = areq_ctx->assoc.mlli_nents;
+
+		if (areq_ctx->is_single_pass) {
+			if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) {
+				mlli_addr = areq_ctx->dst.sram_addr;
+				mlli_nents = areq_ctx->dst.mlli_nents;
+			} else {
+				mlli_addr = areq_ctx->src.sram_addr;
+				mlli_nents = areq_ctx->src.mlli_nents;
+			}
+		}
+
+		dev_dbg(dev, "AUTHENC: SRC/DST buffer type MLLI\n");
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_MLLI, mlli_addr, mlli_nents,
+			     NS_BIT);
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], flow_mode);
+		break;
+	}
+	case CC_DMA_BUF_NULL:
+	default:
+		dev_err(dev, "AUTHENC: Invalid SRC/DST buffer type\n");
+	}
+
+	*seq_size = (++idx);
+}
+
+static void cc_proc_cipher_desc(struct aead_request *areq,
+				unsigned int flow_mode,
+				struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
+				unsigned int *seq_size)
+{
+	unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(areq);
+	enum cc_req_dma_buf_type data_dma_type = areq_ctx->data_buff_type;
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(areq);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+
+	if (areq_ctx->cryptlen == 0)
+		return; /*null processing*/
+
+	switch (data_dma_type) {
+	case CC_DMA_BUF_DLLI:
+		dev_dbg(dev, "CIPHER: SRC/DST buffer type DLLI\n");
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
+			     (sg_dma_address(areq_ctx->src_sgl) +
+			      areq_ctx->src_offset), areq_ctx->cryptlen,
+			      NS_BIT);
+		set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx],
+			      (sg_dma_address(areq_ctx->dst_sgl) +
+			       areq_ctx->dst_offset),
+			      areq_ctx->cryptlen, NS_BIT, 0);
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], flow_mode);
+		break;
+	case CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI:
+		dev_dbg(dev, "CIPHER: SRC/DST buffer type MLLI\n");
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_MLLI, areq_ctx->src.sram_addr,
+			     areq_ctx->src.mlli_nents, NS_BIT);
+		set_dout_mlli(&desc[idx], areq_ctx->dst.sram_addr,
+			      areq_ctx->dst.mlli_nents, NS_BIT, 0);
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], flow_mode);
+		break;
+	case CC_DMA_BUF_NULL:
+	default:
+		dev_err(dev, "CIPHER: Invalid SRC/DST buffer type\n");
+	}
+
+	*seq_size = (++idx);
+}
+
+static void cc_proc_digest_desc(struct aead_request *req,
+				struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
+				unsigned int *seq_size)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
+	unsigned int hash_mode = (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_SHA1) ?
+				DRV_HASH_HW_SHA1 : DRV_HASH_HW_SHA256;
+	int direct = req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type;
+
+	/* Get final ICV result */
+	if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) {
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_HASH_to_DOUT);
+		set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_WRITE_STATE0);
+		set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], req_ctx->icv_dma_addr, ctx->authsize,
+			      NS_BIT, 1);
+		set_queue_last_ind(&desc[idx]);
+		if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC) {
+			set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
+			set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_XCBC_MAC);
+		} else {
+			set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx],
+					   HASH_DIGEST_RESULT_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+			set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
+		}
+	} else { /*Decrypt*/
+		/* Get ICV out from hardware */
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_WRITE_STATE0);
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_HASH_to_DOUT);
+		set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], req_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr,
+			      ctx->authsize, NS_BIT, 1);
+		set_queue_last_ind(&desc[idx]);
+		set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx],
+				   HASH_DIGEST_RESULT_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+		set_cipher_config1(&desc[idx], HASH_PADDING_DISABLED);
+		if (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC) {
+			set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_XCBC_MAC);
+			set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
+		} else {
+			set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
+		}
+	}
+
+	*seq_size = (++idx);
+}
+
+static void cc_set_cipher_desc(struct aead_request *req,
+			       struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
+			       unsigned int *seq_size)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	unsigned int hw_iv_size = req_ctx->hw_iv_size;
+	unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
+	int direct = req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type;
+
+	/* Setup cipher state */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], direct);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], ctx->flow_mode);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, req_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr,
+		     hw_iv_size, NS_BIT);
+	if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CTR)
+		set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE1);
+	else
+		set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE0);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], ctx->cipher_mode);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* Setup enc. key */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], direct);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], ctx->flow_mode);
+	if (ctx->flow_mode == S_DIN_to_AES) {
+		set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, ctx->enckey_dma_addr,
+			     ((ctx->enc_keylen == 24) ? CC_AES_KEY_SIZE_MAX :
+			      ctx->enc_keylen), NS_BIT);
+		set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
+	} else {
+		set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, ctx->enckey_dma_addr,
+			     ctx->enc_keylen, NS_BIT);
+		set_key_size_des(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
+	}
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], ctx->cipher_mode);
+	idx++;
+
+	*seq_size = idx;
+}
+
+static void cc_proc_cipher(struct aead_request *req, struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
+			   unsigned int *seq_size, unsigned int data_flow_mode)
+{
+	struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	int direct = req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type;
+	unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
+
+	if (req_ctx->cryptlen == 0)
+		return; /*null processing*/
+
+	cc_set_cipher_desc(req, desc, &idx);
+	cc_proc_cipher_desc(req, data_flow_mode, desc, &idx);
+	if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) {
+		/* We must wait for DMA to write all cipher */
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_din_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0xfffff0);
+		set_dout_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0, 1);
+		idx++;
+	}
+
+	*seq_size = idx;
+}
+
+static void cc_set_hmac_desc(struct aead_request *req, struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
+			     unsigned int *seq_size)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned int hash_mode = (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_SHA1) ?
+				DRV_HASH_HW_SHA1 : DRV_HASH_HW_SHA256;
+	unsigned int digest_size = (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_SHA1) ?
+				CC_SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE : CC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
+
+	/* Loading hash ipad xor key state */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
+		     ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad_dma_addr, digest_size,
+		     NS_BIT);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE0);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* Load init. digest len (64 bytes) */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
+	set_din_sram(&desc[idx], cc_digest_len_addr(ctx->drvdata, hash_mode),
+		     HASH_LEN_SIZE);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
+	idx++;
+
+	*seq_size = idx;
+}
+
+static void cc_set_xcbc_desc(struct aead_request *req, struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
+			     unsigned int *seq_size)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
+
+	/* Loading MAC state */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0, CC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE0);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_XCBC_MAC);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DESC_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT_ENCRYPT);
+	set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+	set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* Setup XCBC MAC K1 */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
+		     ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr,
+		     AES_KEYSIZE_128, NS_BIT);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_XCBC_MAC);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DESC_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT_ENCRYPT);
+	set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+	set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* Setup XCBC MAC K2 */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
+		     (ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr +
+		      AES_KEYSIZE_128), AES_KEYSIZE_128, NS_BIT);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE1);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_XCBC_MAC);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DESC_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT_ENCRYPT);
+	set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+	set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* Setup XCBC MAC K3 */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
+		     (ctx->auth_state.xcbc.xcbc_keys_dma_addr +
+		      2 * AES_KEYSIZE_128), AES_KEYSIZE_128, NS_BIT);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE2);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_XCBC_MAC);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DESC_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT_ENCRYPT);
+	set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], CC_AES_128_BIT_KEY_SIZE);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+	set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
+	idx++;
+
+	*seq_size = idx;
+}
+
+static void cc_proc_header_desc(struct aead_request *req,
+				struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
+				unsigned int *seq_size)
+{
+	unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
+	/* Hash associated data */
+	if (req->assoclen > 0)
+		cc_set_assoc_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, &idx);
+
+	/* Hash IV */
+	*seq_size = idx;
+}
+
+static void cc_proc_scheme_desc(struct aead_request *req,
+				struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
+				unsigned int *seq_size)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct cc_aead_handle *aead_handle = ctx->drvdata->aead_handle;
+	unsigned int hash_mode = (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_SHA1) ?
+				DRV_HASH_HW_SHA1 : DRV_HASH_HW_SHA256;
+	unsigned int digest_size = (ctx->auth_mode == DRV_HASH_SHA1) ?
+				CC_SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE : CC_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+	unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
+
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
+	set_dout_sram(&desc[idx], aead_handle->sram_workspace_addr,
+		      HASH_LEN_SIZE);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_HASH_to_DOUT);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_WRITE_STATE1);
+	set_cipher_do(&desc[idx], DO_PAD);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* Get final ICV result */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_dout_sram(&desc[idx], aead_handle->sram_workspace_addr,
+		      digest_size);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_HASH_to_DOUT);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_WRITE_STATE0);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], HASH_DIGEST_RESULT_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* Loading hash opad xor key state */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
+		     (ctx->auth_state.hmac.ipad_opad_dma_addr + digest_size),
+		     digest_size, NS_BIT);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE0);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* Load init. digest len (64 bytes) */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], hash_mode);
+	set_din_sram(&desc[idx], cc_digest_len_addr(ctx->drvdata, hash_mode),
+		     HASH_LEN_SIZE);
+	set_cipher_config1(&desc[idx], HASH_PADDING_ENABLED);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* Perform HASH update */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_din_sram(&desc[idx], aead_handle->sram_workspace_addr,
+		     digest_size);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_HASH);
+	idx++;
+
+	*seq_size = idx;
+}
+
+static void cc_mlli_to_sram(struct aead_request *req,
+			    struct cc_hw_desc desc[], unsigned int *seq_size)
+{
+	struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+
+	if (req_ctx->assoc_buff_type == CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI ||
+	    req_ctx->data_buff_type == CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI ||
+	    !req_ctx->is_single_pass) {
+		dev_dbg(dev, "Copy-to-sram: mlli_dma=%08x, mlli_size=%u\n",
+			(unsigned int)ctx->drvdata->mlli_sram_addr,
+			req_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_len);
+		/* Copy MLLI table host-to-sram */
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[*seq_size]);
+		set_din_type(&desc[*seq_size], DMA_DLLI,
+			     req_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_dma_addr,
+			     req_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_len, NS_BIT);
+		set_dout_sram(&desc[*seq_size],
+			      ctx->drvdata->mlli_sram_addr,
+			      req_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_len);
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[*seq_size], BYPASS);
+		(*seq_size)++;
+	}
+}
+
+static enum cc_flow_mode cc_get_data_flow(enum drv_crypto_direction direct,
+					  enum cc_flow_mode setup_flow_mode,
+					  bool is_single_pass)
+{
+	enum cc_flow_mode data_flow_mode;
+
+	if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) {
+		if (setup_flow_mode == S_DIN_to_AES)
+			data_flow_mode = is_single_pass ?
+				AES_to_HASH_and_DOUT : DIN_AES_DOUT;
+		else
+			data_flow_mode = is_single_pass ?
+				DES_to_HASH_and_DOUT : DIN_DES_DOUT;
+	} else { /* Decrypt */
+		if (setup_flow_mode == S_DIN_to_AES)
+			data_flow_mode = is_single_pass ?
+				AES_and_HASH : DIN_AES_DOUT;
+		else
+			data_flow_mode = is_single_pass ?
+				DES_and_HASH : DIN_DES_DOUT;
+	}
+
+	return data_flow_mode;
+}
+
+static void cc_hmac_authenc(struct aead_request *req, struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
+			    unsigned int *seq_size)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	int direct = req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type;
+	unsigned int data_flow_mode =
+		cc_get_data_flow(direct, ctx->flow_mode,
+				 req_ctx->is_single_pass);
+
+	if (req_ctx->is_single_pass) {
+		/**
+		 * Single-pass flow
+		 */
+		cc_set_hmac_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_set_cipher_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_proc_header_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_proc_cipher_desc(req, data_flow_mode, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_proc_scheme_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_proc_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Double-pass flow
+	 * Fallback for unsupported single-pass modes,
+	 * i.e. using assoc. data of non-word-multiple
+	 */
+	if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) {
+		/* encrypt first.. */
+		cc_proc_cipher(req, desc, seq_size, data_flow_mode);
+		/* authenc after..*/
+		cc_set_hmac_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_proc_authen_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, seq_size, direct);
+		cc_proc_scheme_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_proc_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+
+	} else { /*DECRYPT*/
+		/* authenc first..*/
+		cc_set_hmac_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_proc_authen_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, seq_size, direct);
+		cc_proc_scheme_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		/* decrypt after.. */
+		cc_proc_cipher(req, desc, seq_size, data_flow_mode);
+		/* read the digest result with setting the completion bit
+		 * must be after the cipher operation
+		 */
+		cc_proc_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+	}
+}
+
+static void
+cc_xcbc_authenc(struct aead_request *req, struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
+		unsigned int *seq_size)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	int direct = req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type;
+	unsigned int data_flow_mode =
+		cc_get_data_flow(direct, ctx->flow_mode,
+				 req_ctx->is_single_pass);
+
+	if (req_ctx->is_single_pass) {
+		/**
+		 * Single-pass flow
+		 */
+		cc_set_xcbc_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_set_cipher_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_proc_header_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_proc_cipher_desc(req, data_flow_mode, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_proc_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	/**
+	 * Double-pass flow
+	 * Fallback for unsupported single-pass modes,
+	 * i.e. using assoc. data of non-word-multiple
+	 */
+	if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) {
+		/* encrypt first.. */
+		cc_proc_cipher(req, desc, seq_size, data_flow_mode);
+		/* authenc after.. */
+		cc_set_xcbc_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_proc_authen_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, seq_size, direct);
+		cc_proc_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+	} else { /*DECRYPT*/
+		/* authenc first.. */
+		cc_set_xcbc_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_proc_authen_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, seq_size, direct);
+		/* decrypt after..*/
+		cc_proc_cipher(req, desc, seq_size, data_flow_mode);
+		/* read the digest result with setting the completion bit
+		 * must be after the cipher operation
+		 */
+		cc_proc_digest_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+	}
+}
+
+static int validate_data_size(struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx,
+			      enum drv_crypto_direction direct,
+			      struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+	unsigned int assoclen = req->assoclen;
+	unsigned int cipherlen = (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) ?
+			(req->cryptlen - ctx->authsize) : req->cryptlen;
+
+	if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT &&
+	    req->cryptlen < ctx->authsize)
+		goto data_size_err;
+
+	areq_ctx->is_single_pass = true; /*defaulted to fast flow*/
+
+	switch (ctx->flow_mode) {
+	case S_DIN_to_AES:
+		if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CBC &&
+		    !IS_ALIGNED(cipherlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+			goto data_size_err;
+		if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM)
+			break;
+		if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_GCTR) {
+			if (areq_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only)
+				areq_ctx->is_single_pass = false;
+			break;
+		}
+
+		if (!IS_ALIGNED(assoclen, sizeof(u32)))
+			areq_ctx->is_single_pass = false;
+
+		if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CTR &&
+		    !IS_ALIGNED(cipherlen, sizeof(u32)))
+			areq_ctx->is_single_pass = false;
+
+		break;
+	case S_DIN_to_DES:
+		if (!IS_ALIGNED(cipherlen, DES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+			goto data_size_err;
+		if (!IS_ALIGNED(assoclen, DES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+			areq_ctx->is_single_pass = false;
+		break;
+	default:
+		dev_err(dev, "Unexpected flow mode (%d)\n", ctx->flow_mode);
+		goto data_size_err;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+data_size_err:
+	return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static unsigned int format_ccm_a0(u8 *pa0_buff, u32 header_size)
+{
+	unsigned int len = 0;
+
+	if (header_size == 0)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (header_size < ((1UL << 16) - (1UL << 8))) {
+		len = 2;
+
+		pa0_buff[0] = (header_size >> 8) & 0xFF;
+		pa0_buff[1] = header_size & 0xFF;
+	} else {
+		len = 6;
+
+		pa0_buff[0] = 0xFF;
+		pa0_buff[1] = 0xFE;
+		pa0_buff[2] = (header_size >> 24) & 0xFF;
+		pa0_buff[3] = (header_size >> 16) & 0xFF;
+		pa0_buff[4] = (header_size >> 8) & 0xFF;
+		pa0_buff[5] = header_size & 0xFF;
+	}
+
+	return len;
+}
+
+static int set_msg_len(u8 *block, unsigned int msglen, unsigned int csize)
+{
+	__be32 data;
+
+	memset(block, 0, csize);
+	block += csize;
+
+	if (csize >= 4)
+		csize = 4;
+	else if (msglen > (1 << (8 * csize)))
+		return -EOVERFLOW;
+
+	data = cpu_to_be32(msglen);
+	memcpy(block - csize, (u8 *)&data + 4 - csize, csize);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int cc_ccm(struct aead_request *req, struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
+		  unsigned int *seq_size)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
+	unsigned int cipher_flow_mode;
+	dma_addr_t mac_result;
+
+	if (req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) {
+		cipher_flow_mode = AES_to_HASH_and_DOUT;
+		mac_result = req_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr;
+	} else { /* Encrypt */
+		cipher_flow_mode = AES_and_HASH;
+		mac_result = req_ctx->icv_dma_addr;
+	}
+
+	/* load key */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_CTR);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, ctx->enckey_dma_addr,
+		     ((ctx->enc_keylen == 24) ?  CC_AES_KEY_SIZE_MAX :
+		      ctx->enc_keylen), NS_BIT);
+	set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DESC_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT_ENCRYPT);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_AES);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* load ctr state */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_CTR);
+	set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
+		     req_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, NS_BIT);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DESC_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT_ENCRYPT);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE1);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_AES);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* load MAC key */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_CBC_MAC);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, ctx->enckey_dma_addr,
+		     ((ctx->enc_keylen == 24) ?  CC_AES_KEY_SIZE_MAX :
+		      ctx->enc_keylen), NS_BIT);
+	set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DESC_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT_ENCRYPT);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+	set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* load MAC state */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_CBC_MAC);
+	set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, req_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr,
+		     AES_BLOCK_SIZE, NS_BIT);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DESC_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT_ENCRYPT);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE0);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+	set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* process assoc data */
+	if (req->assoclen > 0) {
+		cc_set_assoc_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, &idx);
+	} else {
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
+			     sg_dma_address(&req_ctx->ccm_adata_sg),
+			     AES_BLOCK_SIZE + req_ctx->ccm_hdr_size, NS_BIT);
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_HASH);
+		idx++;
+	}
+
+	/* process the cipher */
+	if (req_ctx->cryptlen)
+		cc_proc_cipher_desc(req, cipher_flow_mode, desc, &idx);
+
+	/* Read temporal MAC */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_CBC_MAC);
+	set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], req_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr, ctx->authsize,
+		      NS_BIT, 0);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_WRITE_STATE0);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], HASH_DIGEST_RESULT_LITTLE_ENDIAN);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_HASH_to_DOUT);
+	set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* load AES-CTR state (for last MAC calculation)*/
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_CTR);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, req_ctx->ccm_iv0_dma_addr,
+		     AES_BLOCK_SIZE, NS_BIT);
+	set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE1);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_AES);
+	idx++;
+
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_din_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0xfffff0);
+	set_dout_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0, 1);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* encrypt the "T" value and store MAC in mac_state */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, req_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr,
+		     ctx->authsize, NS_BIT);
+	set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], mac_result, ctx->authsize, NS_BIT, 1);
+	set_queue_last_ind(&desc[idx]);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_AES_DOUT);
+	idx++;
+
+	*seq_size = idx;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int config_ccm_adata(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	//unsigned int size_of_a = 0, rem_a_size = 0;
+	unsigned int lp = req->iv[0];
+	/* Note: The code assume that req->iv[0] already contains the value
+	 * of L' of RFC3610
+	 */
+	unsigned int l = lp + 1;  /* This is L' of RFC 3610. */
+	unsigned int m = ctx->authsize;  /* This is M' of RFC 3610. */
+	u8 *b0 = req_ctx->ccm_config + CCM_B0_OFFSET;
+	u8 *a0 = req_ctx->ccm_config + CCM_A0_OFFSET;
+	u8 *ctr_count_0 = req_ctx->ccm_config + CCM_CTR_COUNT_0_OFFSET;
+	unsigned int cryptlen = (req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type ==
+				 DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ?
+				req->cryptlen :
+				(req->cryptlen - ctx->authsize);
+	int rc;
+
+	memset(req_ctx->mac_buf, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	memset(req_ctx->ccm_config, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 3);
+
+	/* taken from crypto/ccm.c */
+	/* 2 <= L <= 8, so 1 <= L' <= 7. */
+	if (l < 2 || l > 8) {
+		dev_err(dev, "illegal iv value %X\n", req->iv[0]);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+	memcpy(b0, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+	/* format control info per RFC 3610 and
+	 * NIST Special Publication 800-38C
+	 */
+	*b0 |= (8 * ((m - 2) / 2));
+	if (req->assoclen > 0)
+		*b0 |= 64;  /* Enable bit 6 if Adata exists. */
+
+	rc = set_msg_len(b0 + 16 - l, cryptlen, l);  /* Write L'. */
+	if (rc) {
+		dev_err(dev, "message len overflow detected");
+		return rc;
+	}
+	 /* END of "taken from crypto/ccm.c" */
+
+	/* l(a) - size of associated data. */
+	req_ctx->ccm_hdr_size = format_ccm_a0(a0, req->assoclen);
+
+	memset(req->iv + 15 - req->iv[0], 0, req->iv[0] + 1);
+	req->iv[15] = 1;
+
+	memcpy(ctr_count_0, req->iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	ctr_count_0[15] = 0;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void cc_proc_rfc4309_ccm(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+
+	/* L' */
+	memset(areq_ctx->ctr_iv, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	/* For RFC 4309, always use 4 bytes for message length
+	 * (at most 2^32-1 bytes).
+	 */
+	areq_ctx->ctr_iv[0] = 3;
+
+	/* In RFC 4309 there is an 11-bytes nonce+IV part,
+	 * that we build here.
+	 */
+	memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CCM_BLOCK_NONCE_OFFSET, ctx->ctr_nonce,
+	       CCM_BLOCK_NONCE_SIZE);
+	memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET, req->iv,
+	       CCM_BLOCK_IV_SIZE);
+	req->iv = areq_ctx->ctr_iv;
+	req->assoclen -= CCM_BLOCK_IV_SIZE;
+}
+
+static void cc_set_ghash_desc(struct aead_request *req,
+			      struct cc_hw_desc desc[], unsigned int *seq_size)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
+
+	/* load key to AES*/
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_ECB);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, ctx->enckey_dma_addr,
+		     ctx->enc_keylen, NS_BIT);
+	set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_AES);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* process one zero block to generate hkey */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0x0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], req_ctx->hkey_dma_addr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		      NS_BIT, 0);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_AES_DOUT);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* Memory Barrier */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_din_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0xfffff0);
+	set_dout_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0, 1);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* Load GHASH subkey */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, req_ctx->hkey_dma_addr,
+		     AES_BLOCK_SIZE, NS_BIT);
+	set_dout_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0, 1);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+	set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_HASH_HW_GHASH);
+	set_cipher_config1(&desc[idx], HASH_PADDING_ENABLED);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* Configure Hash Engine to work with GHASH.
+	 * Since it was not possible to extend HASH submodes to add GHASH,
+	 * The following command is necessary in order to
+	 * select GHASH (according to HW designers)
+	 */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_din_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0xfffff0);
+	set_dout_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0, 1);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+	set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_HASH_HW_GHASH);
+	set_cipher_do(&desc[idx], 1); //1=AES_SK RKEK
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
+	set_cipher_config1(&desc[idx], HASH_PADDING_ENABLED);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* Load GHASH initial STATE (which is 0). (for any hash there is an
+	 * initial state)
+	 */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_din_const(&desc[idx], 0x0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+	set_dout_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0, 1);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_HASH);
+	set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_HASH_HW_GHASH);
+	set_cipher_config1(&desc[idx], HASH_PADDING_ENABLED);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE0);
+	idx++;
+
+	*seq_size = idx;
+}
+
+static void cc_set_gctr_desc(struct aead_request *req, struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
+			     unsigned int *seq_size)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
+
+	/* load key to AES*/
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_GCTR);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, ctx->enckey_dma_addr,
+		     ctx->enc_keylen, NS_BIT);
+	set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_KEY0);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_AES);
+	idx++;
+
+	if (req_ctx->cryptlen && !req_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only) {
+		/* load AES/CTR initial CTR value inc by 2*/
+		hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+		set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_GCTR);
+		set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
+		set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI,
+			     req_ctx->gcm_iv_inc2_dma_addr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			     NS_BIT);
+		set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
+		set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE1);
+		set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_AES);
+		idx++;
+	}
+
+	*seq_size = idx;
+}
+
+static void cc_proc_gcm_result(struct aead_request *req,
+			       struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
+			       unsigned int *seq_size)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	dma_addr_t mac_result;
+	unsigned int idx = *seq_size;
+
+	if (req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) {
+		mac_result = req_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr;
+	} else { /* Encrypt */
+		mac_result = req_ctx->icv_dma_addr;
+	}
+
+	/* process(ghash) gcm_block_len */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, req_ctx->gcm_block_len_dma_addr,
+		     AES_BLOCK_SIZE, NS_BIT);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_HASH);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* Store GHASH state after GHASH(Associated Data + Cipher +LenBlock) */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_HASH_HW_GHASH);
+	set_din_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0xfffff0);
+	set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], req_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		      NS_BIT, 0);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_WRITE_STATE0);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_HASH_to_DOUT);
+	set_aes_not_hash_mode(&desc[idx]);
+
+	idx++;
+
+	/* load AES/CTR initial CTR value inc by 1*/
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_GCTR);
+	set_key_size_aes(&desc[idx], ctx->enc_keylen);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, req_ctx->gcm_iv_inc1_dma_addr,
+		     AES_BLOCK_SIZE, NS_BIT);
+	set_cipher_config0(&desc[idx], DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
+	set_setup_mode(&desc[idx], SETUP_LOAD_STATE1);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], S_DIN_to_AES);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* Memory Barrier */
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_din_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0xfffff0);
+	set_dout_no_dma(&desc[idx], 0, 0, 1);
+	idx++;
+
+	/* process GCTR on stored GHASH and store MAC in mac_state*/
+	hw_desc_init(&desc[idx]);
+	set_cipher_mode(&desc[idx], DRV_CIPHER_GCTR);
+	set_din_type(&desc[idx], DMA_DLLI, req_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr,
+		     AES_BLOCK_SIZE, NS_BIT);
+	set_dout_dlli(&desc[idx], mac_result, ctx->authsize, NS_BIT, 1);
+	set_queue_last_ind(&desc[idx]);
+	set_flow_mode(&desc[idx], DIN_AES_DOUT);
+	idx++;
+
+	*seq_size = idx;
+}
+
+static int cc_gcm(struct aead_request *req, struct cc_hw_desc desc[],
+		  unsigned int *seq_size)
+{
+	struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	unsigned int cipher_flow_mode;
+
+	if (req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) {
+		cipher_flow_mode = AES_and_HASH;
+	} else { /* Encrypt */
+		cipher_flow_mode = AES_to_HASH_and_DOUT;
+	}
+
+	//in RFC4543 no data to encrypt. just copy data from src to dest.
+	if (req_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only) {
+		cc_proc_cipher_desc(req, BYPASS, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_set_ghash_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		/* process(ghash) assoc data */
+		cc_set_assoc_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_set_gctr_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+		cc_proc_gcm_result(req, desc, seq_size);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	// for gcm and rfc4106.
+	cc_set_ghash_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+	/* process(ghash) assoc data */
+	if (req->assoclen > 0)
+		cc_set_assoc_desc(req, DIN_HASH, desc, seq_size);
+	cc_set_gctr_desc(req, desc, seq_size);
+	/* process(gctr+ghash) */
+	if (req_ctx->cryptlen)
+		cc_proc_cipher_desc(req, cipher_flow_mode, desc, seq_size);
+	cc_proc_gcm_result(req, desc, seq_size);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int config_gcm_context(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *req_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+
+	unsigned int cryptlen = (req_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type ==
+				 DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ?
+				req->cryptlen :
+				(req->cryptlen - ctx->authsize);
+	__be32 counter = cpu_to_be32(2);
+
+	dev_dbg(dev, "%s() cryptlen = %d, req->assoclen = %d ctx->authsize = %d\n",
+		__func__, cryptlen, req->assoclen, ctx->authsize);
+
+	memset(req_ctx->hkey, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+	memset(req_ctx->mac_buf, 0, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+	memcpy(req->iv + 12, &counter, 4);
+	memcpy(req_ctx->gcm_iv_inc2, req->iv, 16);
+
+	counter = cpu_to_be32(1);
+	memcpy(req->iv + 12, &counter, 4);
+	memcpy(req_ctx->gcm_iv_inc1, req->iv, 16);
+
+	if (!req_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only) {
+		__be64 temp64;
+
+		temp64 = cpu_to_be64(req->assoclen * 8);
+		memcpy(&req_ctx->gcm_len_block.len_a, &temp64, sizeof(temp64));
+		temp64 = cpu_to_be64(cryptlen * 8);
+		memcpy(&req_ctx->gcm_len_block.len_c, &temp64, 8);
+	} else {
+		/* rfc4543=>  all data(AAD,IV,Plain) are considered additional
+		 * data that is nothing is encrypted.
+		 */
+		__be64 temp64;
+
+		temp64 = cpu_to_be64((req->assoclen + GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_SIZE +
+				      cryptlen) * 8);
+		memcpy(&req_ctx->gcm_len_block.len_a, &temp64, sizeof(temp64));
+		temp64 = 0;
+		memcpy(&req_ctx->gcm_len_block.len_c, &temp64, 8);
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void cc_proc_rfc4_gcm(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+
+	memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_NONCE_OFFSET,
+	       ctx->ctr_nonce, GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_NONCE_SIZE);
+	memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_OFFSET, req->iv,
+	       GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_SIZE);
+	req->iv = areq_ctx->ctr_iv;
+	req->assoclen -= GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_SIZE;
+}
+
+static int cc_proc_aead(struct aead_request *req,
+			enum drv_crypto_direction direct)
+{
+	int rc = 0;
+	int seq_len = 0;
+	struct cc_hw_desc desc[MAX_AEAD_PROCESS_SEQ];
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+	struct cc_crypto_req cc_req = {};
+
+	dev_dbg(dev, "%s context=%p req=%p iv=%p src=%p src_ofs=%d dst=%p dst_ofs=%d cryptolen=%d\n",
+		((direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ? "Enc" : "Dec"),
+		ctx, req, req->iv, sg_virt(req->src), req->src->offset,
+		sg_virt(req->dst), req->dst->offset, req->cryptlen);
+
+	/* STAT_PHASE_0: Init and sanity checks */
+
+	/* Check data length according to mode */
+	if (validate_data_size(ctx, direct, req)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "Unsupported crypt/assoc len %d/%d.\n",
+			req->cryptlen, req->assoclen);
+		crypto_aead_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_RES_BAD_BLOCK_LEN);
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	/* Setup DX request structure */
+	cc_req.user_cb = (void *)cc_aead_complete;
+	cc_req.user_arg = (void *)req;
+
+	/* Setup request context */
+	areq_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type = direct;
+	areq_ctx->req_authsize = ctx->authsize;
+	areq_ctx->cipher_mode = ctx->cipher_mode;
+
+	/* STAT_PHASE_1: Map buffers */
+
+	if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CTR) {
+		/* Build CTR IV - Copy nonce from last 4 bytes in
+		 * CTR key to first 4 bytes in CTR IV
+		 */
+		memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv, ctx->ctr_nonce,
+		       CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE);
+		if (!areq_ctx->backup_giv) /*User none-generated IV*/
+			memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE,
+			       req->iv, CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE);
+		/* Initialize counter portion of counter block */
+		*(__be32 *)(areq_ctx->ctr_iv + CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE +
+			    CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE) = cpu_to_be32(1);
+
+		/* Replace with counter iv */
+		req->iv = areq_ctx->ctr_iv;
+		areq_ctx->hw_iv_size = CTR_RFC3686_BLOCK_SIZE;
+	} else if ((ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM) ||
+		   (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_GCTR)) {
+		areq_ctx->hw_iv_size = AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+		if (areq_ctx->ctr_iv != req->iv) {
+			memcpy(areq_ctx->ctr_iv, req->iv,
+			       crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm));
+			req->iv = areq_ctx->ctr_iv;
+		}
+	}  else {
+		areq_ctx->hw_iv_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+	}
+
+	if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM) {
+		rc = config_ccm_adata(req);
+		if (rc) {
+			dev_dbg(dev, "config_ccm_adata() returned with a failure %d!",
+				rc);
+			goto exit;
+		}
+	} else {
+		areq_ctx->ccm_hdr_size = ccm_header_size_null;
+	}
+
+	if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_GCTR) {
+		rc = config_gcm_context(req);
+		if (rc) {
+			dev_dbg(dev, "config_gcm_context() returned with a failure %d!",
+				rc);
+			goto exit;
+		}
+	}
+
+	rc = cc_map_aead_request(ctx->drvdata, req);
+	if (rc) {
+		dev_err(dev, "map_request() failed\n");
+		goto exit;
+	}
+
+	/* do we need to generate IV? */
+	if (areq_ctx->backup_giv) {
+		/* set the DMA mapped IV address*/
+		if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CTR) {
+			cc_req.ivgen_dma_addr[0] =
+				areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr +
+				CTR_RFC3686_NONCE_SIZE;
+			cc_req.ivgen_dma_addr_len = 1;
+		} else if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM) {
+			/* In ccm, the IV needs to exist both inside B0 and
+			 * inside the counter.It is also copied to iv_dma_addr
+			 * for other reasons (like returning it to the user).
+			 * So, using 3 (identical) IV outputs.
+			 */
+			cc_req.ivgen_dma_addr[0] =
+				areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr +
+				CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET;
+			cc_req.ivgen_dma_addr[1] =
+				sg_dma_address(&areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg) +
+				CCM_B0_OFFSET + CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET;
+			cc_req.ivgen_dma_addr[2] =
+				sg_dma_address(&areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg) +
+				CCM_CTR_COUNT_0_OFFSET + CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET;
+			cc_req.ivgen_dma_addr_len = 3;
+		} else {
+			cc_req.ivgen_dma_addr[0] =
+				areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr;
+			cc_req.ivgen_dma_addr_len = 1;
+		}
+
+		/* set the IV size (8/16 B long)*/
+		cc_req.ivgen_size = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+	}
+
+	/* STAT_PHASE_2: Create sequence */
+
+	/* Load MLLI tables to SRAM if necessary */
+	cc_mlli_to_sram(req, desc, &seq_len);
+
+	/*TODO: move seq len by reference */
+	switch (ctx->auth_mode) {
+	case DRV_HASH_SHA1:
+	case DRV_HASH_SHA256:
+		cc_hmac_authenc(req, desc, &seq_len);
+		break;
+	case DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC:
+		cc_xcbc_authenc(req, desc, &seq_len);
+		break;
+	case DRV_HASH_NULL:
+		if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_CCM)
+			cc_ccm(req, desc, &seq_len);
+		if (ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_GCTR)
+			cc_gcm(req, desc, &seq_len);
+		break;
+	default:
+		dev_err(dev, "Unsupported authenc (%d)\n", ctx->auth_mode);
+		cc_unmap_aead_request(dev, req);
+		rc = -ENOTSUPP;
+		goto exit;
+	}
+
+	/* STAT_PHASE_3: Lock HW and push sequence */
+
+	rc = cc_send_request(ctx->drvdata, &cc_req, desc, seq_len, &req->base);
+
+	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY) {
+		dev_err(dev, "send_request() failed (rc=%d)\n", rc);
+		cc_unmap_aead_request(dev, req);
+	}
+
+exit:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int cc_aead_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	int rc;
+
+	/* No generated IV required */
+	areq_ctx->backup_iv = req->iv;
+	areq_ctx->backup_giv = NULL;
+	areq_ctx->is_gcm4543 = false;
+
+	areq_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only = false;
+
+	rc = cc_proc_aead(req, DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
+	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY)
+		req->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int cc_rfc4309_ccm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	/* Very similar to cc_aead_encrypt() above. */
+
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+	int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!valid_assoclen(req)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "invalid Assoclen:%u\n", req->assoclen);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* No generated IV required */
+	areq_ctx->backup_iv = req->iv;
+	areq_ctx->backup_giv = NULL;
+	areq_ctx->is_gcm4543 = true;
+
+	cc_proc_rfc4309_ccm(req);
+
+	rc = cc_proc_aead(req, DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
+	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY)
+		req->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int cc_aead_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	int rc;
+
+	/* No generated IV required */
+	areq_ctx->backup_iv = req->iv;
+	areq_ctx->backup_giv = NULL;
+	areq_ctx->is_gcm4543 = false;
+
+	areq_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only = false;
+
+	rc = cc_proc_aead(req, DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT);
+	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY)
+		req->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int cc_rfc4309_ccm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!valid_assoclen(req)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "invalid Assoclen:%u\n", req->assoclen);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* No generated IV required */
+	areq_ctx->backup_iv = req->iv;
+	areq_ctx->backup_giv = NULL;
+
+	areq_ctx->is_gcm4543 = true;
+	cc_proc_rfc4309_ccm(req);
+
+	rc = cc_proc_aead(req, DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT);
+	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY)
+		req->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
+
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int cc_rfc4106_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+				 unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+
+	dev_dbg(dev, "%s()  keylen %d, key %p\n", __func__, keylen, key);
+
+	if (keylen < 4)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	keylen -= 4;
+	memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, key + keylen, 4);
+
+	return cc_aead_setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
+}
+
+static int cc_rfc4543_gcm_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key,
+				 unsigned int keylen)
+{
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+
+	dev_dbg(dev, "%s()  keylen %d, key %p\n", __func__, keylen, key);
+
+	if (keylen < 4)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	keylen -= 4;
+	memcpy(ctx->ctr_nonce, key + keylen, 4);
+
+	return cc_aead_setkey(tfm, key, keylen);
+}
+
+static int cc_gcm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
+			      unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	switch (authsize) {
+	case 4:
+	case 8:
+	case 12:
+	case 13:
+	case 14:
+	case 15:
+	case 16:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return cc_aead_setauthsize(authenc, authsize);
+}
+
+static int cc_rfc4106_gcm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
+				      unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+
+	dev_dbg(dev, "authsize %d\n", authsize);
+
+	switch (authsize) {
+	case 8:
+	case 12:
+	case 16:
+		break;
+	default:
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return cc_aead_setauthsize(authenc, authsize);
+}
+
+static int cc_rfc4543_gcm_setauthsize(struct crypto_aead *authenc,
+				      unsigned int authsize)
+{
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(authenc);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+
+	dev_dbg(dev, "authsize %d\n", authsize);
+
+	if (authsize != 16)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	return cc_aead_setauthsize(authenc, authsize);
+}
+
+static int cc_rfc4106_gcm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	/* Very similar to cc_aead_encrypt() above. */
+
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!valid_assoclen(req)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "invalid Assoclen:%u\n", req->assoclen);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* No generated IV required */
+	areq_ctx->backup_iv = req->iv;
+	areq_ctx->backup_giv = NULL;
+
+	areq_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only = false;
+
+	cc_proc_rfc4_gcm(req);
+	areq_ctx->is_gcm4543 = true;
+
+	rc = cc_proc_aead(req, DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
+	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY)
+		req->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int cc_rfc4543_gcm_encrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	/* Very similar to cc_aead_encrypt() above. */
+
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	int rc;
+
+	//plaintext is not encryped with rfc4543
+	areq_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only = true;
+
+	/* No generated IV required */
+	areq_ctx->backup_iv = req->iv;
+	areq_ctx->backup_giv = NULL;
+
+	cc_proc_rfc4_gcm(req);
+	areq_ctx->is_gcm4543 = true;
+
+	rc = cc_proc_aead(req, DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT);
+	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY)
+		req->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int cc_rfc4106_gcm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	/* Very similar to cc_aead_decrypt() above. */
+
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(ctx->drvdata);
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	int rc = -EINVAL;
+
+	if (!valid_assoclen(req)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "invalid Assoclen:%u\n", req->assoclen);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	/* No generated IV required */
+	areq_ctx->backup_iv = req->iv;
+	areq_ctx->backup_giv = NULL;
+
+	areq_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only = false;
+
+	cc_proc_rfc4_gcm(req);
+	areq_ctx->is_gcm4543 = true;
+
+	rc = cc_proc_aead(req, DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT);
+	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY)
+		req->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
+out:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int cc_rfc4543_gcm_decrypt(struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	/* Very similar to cc_aead_decrypt() above. */
+
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	int rc;
+
+	//plaintext is not decryped with rfc4543
+	areq_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only = true;
+
+	/* No generated IV required */
+	areq_ctx->backup_iv = req->iv;
+	areq_ctx->backup_giv = NULL;
+
+	cc_proc_rfc4_gcm(req);
+	areq_ctx->is_gcm4543 = true;
+
+	rc = cc_proc_aead(req, DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT);
+	if (rc != -EINPROGRESS && rc != -EBUSY)
+		req->iv = areq_ctx->backup_iv;
+
+	return rc;
+}
+
+/* DX Block aead alg */
+static struct cc_alg_template aead_algs[] = {
+	{
+		.name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(aes))",
+		.driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-aes-dx",
+		.blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
+		.template_aead = {
+			.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
+			.setauthsize = cc_aead_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
+			.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
+			.init = cc_aead_init,
+			.exit = cc_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.maxauthsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		},
+		.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CBC,
+		.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
+		.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_SHA1,
+	},
+	{
+		.name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des3_ede))",
+		.driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-des3-dx",
+		.blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
+		.template_aead = {
+			.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
+			.setauthsize = cc_aead_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
+			.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
+			.init = cc_aead_init,
+			.exit = cc_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.maxauthsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		},
+		.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CBC,
+		.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_DES,
+		.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_SHA1,
+	},
+	{
+		.name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
+		.driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-cbc-aes-dx",
+		.blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
+		.template_aead = {
+			.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
+			.setauthsize = cc_aead_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
+			.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
+			.init = cc_aead_init,
+			.exit = cc_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.maxauthsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		},
+		.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CBC,
+		.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
+		.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_SHA256,
+	},
+	{
+		.name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des3_ede))",
+		.driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-cbc-des3-dx",
+		.blocksize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
+		.template_aead = {
+			.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
+			.setauthsize = cc_aead_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
+			.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
+			.init = cc_aead_init,
+			.exit = cc_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.maxauthsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		},
+		.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CBC,
+		.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_DES,
+		.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_SHA256,
+	},
+	{
+		.name = "authenc(xcbc(aes),cbc(aes))",
+		.driver_name = "authenc-xcbc-aes-cbc-aes-dx",
+		.blocksize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
+		.template_aead = {
+			.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
+			.setauthsize = cc_aead_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
+			.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
+			.init = cc_aead_init,
+			.exit = cc_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		},
+		.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CBC,
+		.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
+		.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC,
+	},
+	{
+		.name = "authenc(hmac(sha1),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))",
+		.driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha1-rfc3686-ctr-aes-dx",
+		.blocksize = 1,
+		.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
+		.template_aead = {
+			.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
+			.setauthsize = cc_aead_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
+			.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
+			.init = cc_aead_init,
+			.exit = cc_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize = CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE,
+			.maxauthsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		},
+		.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CTR,
+		.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
+		.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_SHA1,
+	},
+	{
+		.name = "authenc(hmac(sha256),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))",
+		.driver_name = "authenc-hmac-sha256-rfc3686-ctr-aes-dx",
+		.blocksize = 1,
+		.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
+		.template_aead = {
+			.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
+			.setauthsize = cc_aead_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
+			.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
+			.init = cc_aead_init,
+			.exit = cc_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize = CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE,
+			.maxauthsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
+		},
+		.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CTR,
+		.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
+		.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_SHA256,
+	},
+	{
+		.name = "authenc(xcbc(aes),rfc3686(ctr(aes)))",
+		.driver_name = "authenc-xcbc-aes-rfc3686-ctr-aes-dx",
+		.blocksize = 1,
+		.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
+		.template_aead = {
+			.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
+			.setauthsize = cc_aead_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
+			.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
+			.init = cc_aead_init,
+			.exit = cc_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize = CTR_RFC3686_IV_SIZE,
+			.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		},
+		.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CTR,
+		.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
+		.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_XCBC_MAC,
+	},
+	{
+		.name = "ccm(aes)",
+		.driver_name = "ccm-aes-dx",
+		.blocksize = 1,
+		.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
+		.template_aead = {
+			.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
+			.setauthsize = cc_ccm_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
+			.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
+			.init = cc_aead_init,
+			.exit = cc_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+			.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		},
+		.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CCM,
+		.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
+		.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_NULL,
+	},
+	{
+		.name = "rfc4309(ccm(aes))",
+		.driver_name = "rfc4309-ccm-aes-dx",
+		.blocksize = 1,
+		.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
+		.template_aead = {
+			.setkey = cc_rfc4309_ccm_setkey,
+			.setauthsize = cc_rfc4309_ccm_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt = cc_rfc4309_ccm_encrypt,
+			.decrypt = cc_rfc4309_ccm_decrypt,
+			.init = cc_aead_init,
+			.exit = cc_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize = CCM_BLOCK_IV_SIZE,
+			.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		},
+		.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_CCM,
+		.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
+		.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_NULL,
+	},
+	{
+		.name = "gcm(aes)",
+		.driver_name = "gcm-aes-dx",
+		.blocksize = 1,
+		.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
+		.template_aead = {
+			.setkey = cc_aead_setkey,
+			.setauthsize = cc_gcm_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt = cc_aead_encrypt,
+			.decrypt = cc_aead_decrypt,
+			.init = cc_aead_init,
+			.exit = cc_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize = 12,
+			.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		},
+		.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_GCTR,
+		.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
+		.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_NULL,
+	},
+	{
+		.name = "rfc4106(gcm(aes))",
+		.driver_name = "rfc4106-gcm-aes-dx",
+		.blocksize = 1,
+		.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
+		.template_aead = {
+			.setkey = cc_rfc4106_gcm_setkey,
+			.setauthsize = cc_rfc4106_gcm_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt = cc_rfc4106_gcm_encrypt,
+			.decrypt = cc_rfc4106_gcm_decrypt,
+			.init = cc_aead_init,
+			.exit = cc_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize = GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_SIZE,
+			.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		},
+		.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_GCTR,
+		.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
+		.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_NULL,
+	},
+	{
+		.name = "rfc4543(gcm(aes))",
+		.driver_name = "rfc4543-gcm-aes-dx",
+		.blocksize = 1,
+		.type = CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_AEAD,
+		.template_aead = {
+			.setkey = cc_rfc4543_gcm_setkey,
+			.setauthsize = cc_rfc4543_gcm_setauthsize,
+			.encrypt = cc_rfc4543_gcm_encrypt,
+			.decrypt = cc_rfc4543_gcm_decrypt,
+			.init = cc_aead_init,
+			.exit = cc_aead_exit,
+			.ivsize = GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_SIZE,
+			.maxauthsize = AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+		},
+		.cipher_mode = DRV_CIPHER_GCTR,
+		.flow_mode = S_DIN_to_AES,
+		.auth_mode = DRV_HASH_NULL,
+	},
+};
+
+static struct cc_crypto_alg *cc_create_aead_alg(struct cc_alg_template *tmpl,
+						struct device *dev)
+{
+	struct cc_crypto_alg *t_alg;
+	struct aead_alg *alg;
+
+	t_alg = kzalloc(sizeof(*t_alg), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!t_alg)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+	alg = &tmpl->template_aead;
+
+	snprintf(alg->base.cra_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s",
+		 tmpl->name);
+	snprintf(alg->base.cra_driver_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "%s",
+		 tmpl->driver_name);
+	alg->base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE;
+	alg->base.cra_priority = CC_CRA_PRIO;
+
+	alg->base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct cc_aead_ctx);
+	alg->base.cra_flags = CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC | CRYPTO_ALG_KERN_DRIVER_ONLY |
+			 tmpl->type;
+	alg->init = cc_aead_init;
+	alg->exit = cc_aead_exit;
+
+	t_alg->aead_alg = *alg;
+
+	t_alg->cipher_mode = tmpl->cipher_mode;
+	t_alg->flow_mode = tmpl->flow_mode;
+	t_alg->auth_mode = tmpl->auth_mode;
+
+	return t_alg;
+}
+
+int cc_aead_free(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata)
+{
+	struct cc_crypto_alg *t_alg, *n;
+	struct cc_aead_handle *aead_handle =
+		(struct cc_aead_handle *)drvdata->aead_handle;
+
+	if (aead_handle) {
+		/* Remove registered algs */
+		list_for_each_entry_safe(t_alg, n, &aead_handle->aead_list,
+					 entry) {
+			crypto_unregister_aead(&t_alg->aead_alg);
+			list_del(&t_alg->entry);
+			kfree(t_alg);
+		}
+		kfree(aead_handle);
+		drvdata->aead_handle = NULL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+int cc_aead_alloc(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata)
+{
+	struct cc_aead_handle *aead_handle;
+	struct cc_crypto_alg *t_alg;
+	int rc = -ENOMEM;
+	int alg;
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(drvdata);
+
+	aead_handle = kmalloc(sizeof(*aead_handle), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!aead_handle) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto fail0;
+	}
+
+	INIT_LIST_HEAD(&aead_handle->aead_list);
+	drvdata->aead_handle = aead_handle;
+
+	aead_handle->sram_workspace_addr = cc_sram_alloc(drvdata,
+							 MAX_HMAC_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+	if (aead_handle->sram_workspace_addr == NULL_SRAM_ADDR) {
+		dev_err(dev, "SRAM pool exhausted\n");
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto fail1;
+	}
+
+	/* Linux crypto */
+	for (alg = 0; alg < ARRAY_SIZE(aead_algs); alg++) {
+		t_alg = cc_create_aead_alg(&aead_algs[alg], dev);
+		if (IS_ERR(t_alg)) {
+			rc = PTR_ERR(t_alg);
+			dev_err(dev, "%s alg allocation failed\n",
+				aead_algs[alg].driver_name);
+			goto fail1;
+		}
+		t_alg->drvdata = drvdata;
+		rc = crypto_register_aead(&t_alg->aead_alg);
+		if (rc) {
+			dev_err(dev, "%s alg registration failed\n",
+				t_alg->aead_alg.base.cra_driver_name);
+			goto fail2;
+		} else {
+			list_add_tail(&t_alg->entry, &aead_handle->aead_list);
+			dev_dbg(dev, "Registered %s\n",
+				t_alg->aead_alg.base.cra_driver_name);
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+
+fail2:
+	kfree(t_alg);
+fail1:
+	cc_aead_free(drvdata);
+fail0:
+	return rc;
+}
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.h b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5edf3b3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_aead.h
@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/* Copyright (C) 2012-2018 ARM Limited or its affiliates. */
+
+/* \file cc_aead.h
+ * ARM CryptoCell AEAD Crypto API
+ */
+
+#ifndef __CC_AEAD_H__
+#define __CC_AEAD_H__
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
+#include <crypto/ctr.h>
+
+/* mac_cmp - HW writes 8 B but all bytes hold the same value */
+#define ICV_CMP_SIZE 8
+#define CCM_CONFIG_BUF_SIZE (AES_BLOCK_SIZE * 3)
+#define MAX_MAC_SIZE SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE
+
+/* defines for AES GCM configuration buffer */
+#define GCM_BLOCK_LEN_SIZE 8
+
+#define GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_OFFSET	4
+#define GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_SIZE		8  /* IV size for rfc's */
+#define GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_NONCE_OFFSET	0
+#define GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_NONCE_SIZE	4
+
+/* Offsets into AES CCM configuration buffer */
+#define CCM_B0_OFFSET 0
+#define CCM_A0_OFFSET 16
+#define CCM_CTR_COUNT_0_OFFSET 32
+/* CCM B0 and CTR_COUNT constants. */
+#define CCM_BLOCK_NONCE_OFFSET 1  /* Nonce offset inside B0 and CTR_COUNT */
+#define CCM_BLOCK_NONCE_SIZE   3  /* Nonce size inside B0 and CTR_COUNT */
+#define CCM_BLOCK_IV_OFFSET    4  /* IV offset inside B0 and CTR_COUNT */
+#define CCM_BLOCK_IV_SIZE      8  /* IV size inside B0 and CTR_COUNT */
+
+enum aead_ccm_header_size {
+	ccm_header_size_null = -1,
+	ccm_header_size_zero = 0,
+	ccm_header_size_2 = 2,
+	ccm_header_size_6 = 6,
+	ccm_header_size_max = S32_MAX
+};
+
+struct aead_req_ctx {
+	/* Allocate cache line although only 4 bytes are needed to
+	 *  assure next field falls @ cache line
+	 *  Used for both: digest HW compare and CCM/GCM MAC value
+	 */
+	u8 mac_buf[MAX_MAC_SIZE] ____cacheline_aligned;
+	u8 ctr_iv[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] ____cacheline_aligned;
+
+	//used in gcm
+	u8 gcm_iv_inc1[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] ____cacheline_aligned;
+	u8 gcm_iv_inc2[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] ____cacheline_aligned;
+	u8 hkey[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] ____cacheline_aligned;
+	struct {
+		u8 len_a[GCM_BLOCK_LEN_SIZE] ____cacheline_aligned;
+		u8 len_c[GCM_BLOCK_LEN_SIZE];
+	} gcm_len_block;
+
+	u8 ccm_config[CCM_CONFIG_BUF_SIZE] ____cacheline_aligned;
+	/* HW actual size input */
+	unsigned int hw_iv_size ____cacheline_aligned;
+	/* used to prevent cache coherence problem */
+	u8 backup_mac[MAX_MAC_SIZE];
+	u8 *backup_iv; /*store iv for generated IV flow*/
+	u8 *backup_giv; /*store iv for rfc3686(ctr) flow*/
+	dma_addr_t mac_buf_dma_addr; /* internal ICV DMA buffer */
+	/* buffer for internal ccm configurations */
+	dma_addr_t ccm_iv0_dma_addr;
+	dma_addr_t icv_dma_addr; /* Phys. address of ICV */
+
+	//used in gcm
+	/* buffer for internal gcm configurations */
+	dma_addr_t gcm_iv_inc1_dma_addr;
+	/* buffer for internal gcm configurations */
+	dma_addr_t gcm_iv_inc2_dma_addr;
+	dma_addr_t hkey_dma_addr; /* Phys. address of hkey */
+	dma_addr_t gcm_block_len_dma_addr; /* Phys. address of gcm block len */
+	bool is_gcm4543;
+
+	u8 *icv_virt_addr; /* Virt. address of ICV */
+	struct async_gen_req_ctx gen_ctx;
+	struct cc_mlli assoc;
+	struct cc_mlli src;
+	struct cc_mlli dst;
+	struct scatterlist *src_sgl;
+	struct scatterlist *dst_sgl;
+	unsigned int src_offset;
+	unsigned int dst_offset;
+	enum cc_req_dma_buf_type assoc_buff_type;
+	enum cc_req_dma_buf_type data_buff_type;
+	struct mlli_params mlli_params;
+	unsigned int cryptlen;
+	struct scatterlist ccm_adata_sg;
+	enum aead_ccm_header_size ccm_hdr_size;
+	unsigned int req_authsize;
+	enum drv_cipher_mode cipher_mode;
+	bool is_icv_fragmented;
+	bool is_single_pass;
+	bool plaintext_authenticate_only; //for gcm_rfc4543
+};
+
+int cc_aead_alloc(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata);
+int cc_aead_free(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata);
+
+#endif /*__CC_AEAD_H__*/
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c
index 1ff379b..14b2eab 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
 /* Copyright (C) 2012-2018 ARM Limited or its affiliates. */
 
+#include <crypto/internal/aead.h>
 #include <crypto/authenc.h>
 #include <crypto/scatterwalk.h>
 #include <linux/dmapool.h>
@@ -10,6 +11,7 @@
 #include "cc_lli_defs.h"
 #include "cc_cipher.h"
 #include "cc_hash.h"
+#include "cc_aead.h"
 
 enum dma_buffer_type {
 	DMA_NULL_TYPE = -1,
@@ -52,6 +54,27 @@ static inline char *cc_dma_buf_type(enum cc_req_dma_buf_type type)
 }
 
 /**
+ * cc_copy_mac() - Copy MAC to temporary location
+ *
+ * @dev: device object
+ * @req: aead request object
+ * @dir: [IN] copy from/to sgl
+ */
+static void cc_copy_mac(struct device *dev, struct aead_request *req,
+			enum cc_sg_cpy_direct dir)
+{
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	u32 skip = req->assoclen + req->cryptlen;
+
+	if (areq_ctx->is_gcm4543)
+		skip += crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+
+	cc_copy_sg_portion(dev, areq_ctx->backup_mac, req->src,
+			   (skip - areq_ctx->req_authsize), skip, dir);
+}
+
+/**
  * cc_get_sgl_nents() - Get scatterlist number of entries.
  *
  * @sg_list: SG list
@@ -246,6 +269,27 @@ static int cc_generate_mlli(struct device *dev, struct buffer_array *sg_data,
 	return rc;
 }
 
+static void cc_add_buffer_entry(struct device *dev,
+				struct buffer_array *sgl_data,
+				dma_addr_t buffer_dma, unsigned int buffer_len,
+				bool is_last_entry, u32 *mlli_nents)
+{
+	unsigned int index = sgl_data->num_of_buffers;
+
+	dev_dbg(dev, "index=%u single_buff=%pad buffer_len=0x%08X is_last=%d\n",
+		index, &buffer_dma, buffer_len, is_last_entry);
+	sgl_data->nents[index] = 1;
+	sgl_data->entry[index].buffer_dma = buffer_dma;
+	sgl_data->offset[index] = 0;
+	sgl_data->total_data_len[index] = buffer_len;
+	sgl_data->type[index] = DMA_BUFF_TYPE;
+	sgl_data->is_last[index] = is_last_entry;
+	sgl_data->mlli_nents[index] = mlli_nents;
+	if (sgl_data->mlli_nents[index])
+		*sgl_data->mlli_nents[index] = 0;
+	sgl_data->num_of_buffers++;
+}
+
 static void cc_add_sg_entry(struct device *dev, struct buffer_array *sgl_data,
 			    unsigned int nents, struct scatterlist *sgl,
 			    unsigned int data_len, unsigned int data_offset,
@@ -349,6 +393,33 @@ static int cc_map_sg(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sg,
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int
+cc_set_aead_conf_buf(struct device *dev, struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx,
+		     u8 *config_data, struct buffer_array *sg_data,
+		     unsigned int assoclen)
+{
+	dev_dbg(dev, " handle additional data config set to DLLI\n");
+	/* create sg for the current buffer */
+	sg_init_one(&areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg, config_data,
+		    AES_BLOCK_SIZE + areq_ctx->ccm_hdr_size);
+	if (dma_map_sg(dev, &areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg, 1, DMA_TO_DEVICE) != 1) {
+		dev_err(dev, "dma_map_sg() config buffer failed\n");
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	dev_dbg(dev, "Mapped curr_buff: dma_address=%pad page=%p addr=%pK offset=%u length=%u\n",
+		&sg_dma_address(&areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg),
+		sg_page(&areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg),
+		sg_virt(&areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg),
+		areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg.offset, areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg.length);
+	/* prepare for case of MLLI */
+	if (assoclen > 0) {
+		cc_add_sg_entry(dev, sg_data, 1, &areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg,
+				(AES_BLOCK_SIZE + areq_ctx->ccm_hdr_size),
+				0, false, NULL);
+	}
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int cc_set_hash_buf(struct device *dev, struct ahash_req_ctx *areq_ctx,
 			   u8 *curr_buff, u32 curr_buff_cnt,
 			   struct buffer_array *sg_data)
@@ -497,6 +568,817 @@ int cc_map_blkcipher_request(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata, void *ctx,
 	return rc;
 }
 
+void cc_unmap_aead_request(struct device *dev, struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	unsigned int hw_iv_size = areq_ctx->hw_iv_size;
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	struct cc_drvdata *drvdata = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+	u32 dummy;
+	bool chained;
+	u32 size_to_unmap = 0;
+
+	if (areq_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr) {
+		dma_unmap_single(dev, areq_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr,
+				 MAX_MAC_SIZE, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+	}
+
+	if (areq_ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_GCTR) {
+		if (areq_ctx->hkey_dma_addr) {
+			dma_unmap_single(dev, areq_ctx->hkey_dma_addr,
+					 AES_BLOCK_SIZE, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+		}
+
+		if (areq_ctx->gcm_block_len_dma_addr) {
+			dma_unmap_single(dev, areq_ctx->gcm_block_len_dma_addr,
+					 AES_BLOCK_SIZE, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+		}
+
+		if (areq_ctx->gcm_iv_inc1_dma_addr) {
+			dma_unmap_single(dev, areq_ctx->gcm_iv_inc1_dma_addr,
+					 AES_BLOCK_SIZE, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+		}
+
+		if (areq_ctx->gcm_iv_inc2_dma_addr) {
+			dma_unmap_single(dev, areq_ctx->gcm_iv_inc2_dma_addr,
+					 AES_BLOCK_SIZE, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (areq_ctx->ccm_hdr_size != ccm_header_size_null) {
+		if (areq_ctx->ccm_iv0_dma_addr) {
+			dma_unmap_single(dev, areq_ctx->ccm_iv0_dma_addr,
+					 AES_BLOCK_SIZE, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+		}
+
+		dma_unmap_sg(dev, &areq_ctx->ccm_adata_sg, 1, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+	}
+	if (areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr) {
+		dma_unmap_single(dev, areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr,
+				 hw_iv_size, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+	}
+
+	/*In case a pool was set, a table was
+	 *allocated and should be released
+	 */
+	if (areq_ctx->mlli_params.curr_pool) {
+		dev_dbg(dev, "free MLLI buffer: dma=%pad virt=%pK\n",
+			&areq_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_dma_addr,
+			areq_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_virt_addr);
+		dma_pool_free(areq_ctx->mlli_params.curr_pool,
+			      areq_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_virt_addr,
+			      areq_ctx->mlli_params.mlli_dma_addr);
+	}
+
+	dev_dbg(dev, "Unmapping src sgl: req->src=%pK areq_ctx->src.nents=%u areq_ctx->assoc.nents=%u assoclen:%u cryptlen=%u\n",
+		sg_virt(req->src), areq_ctx->src.nents, areq_ctx->assoc.nents,
+		req->assoclen, req->cryptlen);
+	size_to_unmap = req->assoclen + req->cryptlen;
+	if (areq_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT)
+		size_to_unmap += areq_ctx->req_authsize;
+	if (areq_ctx->is_gcm4543)
+		size_to_unmap += crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+
+	dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->src,
+		     cc_get_sgl_nents(dev, req->src, size_to_unmap,
+				      &dummy, &chained),
+		     DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+	if (req->src != req->dst) {
+		dev_dbg(dev, "Unmapping dst sgl: req->dst=%pK\n",
+			sg_virt(req->dst));
+		dma_unmap_sg(dev, req->dst,
+			     cc_get_sgl_nents(dev, req->dst, size_to_unmap,
+					      &dummy, &chained),
+			     DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+	}
+	if (drvdata->coherent &&
+	    areq_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT &&
+	    req->src == req->dst) {
+		/* copy back mac from temporary location to deal with possible
+		 * data memory overriding that caused by cache coherence
+		 * problem.
+		 */
+		cc_copy_mac(dev, req, CC_SG_FROM_BUF);
+	}
+}
+
+static int cc_get_aead_icv_nents(struct device *dev, struct scatterlist *sgl,
+				 unsigned int sgl_nents, unsigned int authsize,
+				 u32 last_entry_data_size,
+				 bool *is_icv_fragmented)
+{
+	unsigned int icv_max_size = 0;
+	unsigned int icv_required_size = authsize > last_entry_data_size ?
+					(authsize - last_entry_data_size) :
+					authsize;
+	unsigned int nents;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (sgl_nents < MAX_ICV_NENTS_SUPPORTED) {
+		*is_icv_fragmented = false;
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	for (i = 0 ; i < (sgl_nents - MAX_ICV_NENTS_SUPPORTED) ; i++) {
+		if (!sgl)
+			break;
+		sgl = sg_next(sgl);
+	}
+
+	if (sgl)
+		icv_max_size = sgl->length;
+
+	if (last_entry_data_size > authsize) {
+		/* ICV attached to data in last entry (not fragmented!) */
+		nents = 0;
+		*is_icv_fragmented = false;
+	} else if (last_entry_data_size == authsize) {
+		/* ICV placed in whole last entry (not fragmented!) */
+		nents = 1;
+		*is_icv_fragmented = false;
+	} else if (icv_max_size > icv_required_size) {
+		nents = 1;
+		*is_icv_fragmented = true;
+	} else if (icv_max_size == icv_required_size) {
+		nents = 2;
+		*is_icv_fragmented = true;
+	} else {
+		dev_err(dev, "Unsupported num. of ICV fragments (> %d)\n",
+			MAX_ICV_NENTS_SUPPORTED);
+		nents = -1; /*unsupported*/
+	}
+	dev_dbg(dev, "is_frag=%s icv_nents=%u\n",
+		(*is_icv_fragmented ? "true" : "false"), nents);
+
+	return nents;
+}
+
+static int cc_aead_chain_iv(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata,
+			    struct aead_request *req,
+			    struct buffer_array *sg_data,
+			    bool is_last, bool do_chain)
+{
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	unsigned int hw_iv_size = areq_ctx->hw_iv_size;
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(drvdata);
+	int rc = 0;
+
+	if (!req->iv) {
+		areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr = 0;
+		goto chain_iv_exit;
+	}
+
+	areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr = dma_map_single(dev, req->iv,
+						       hw_iv_size,
+						       DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "Mapping iv %u B at va=%pK for DMA failed\n",
+			hw_iv_size, req->iv);
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto chain_iv_exit;
+	}
+
+	dev_dbg(dev, "Mapped iv %u B at va=%pK to dma=%pad\n",
+		hw_iv_size, req->iv, &areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr);
+	// TODO: what about CTR?? ask Ron
+	if (do_chain && areq_ctx->plaintext_authenticate_only) {
+		struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+		unsigned int iv_size_to_authenc = crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+		unsigned int iv_ofs = GCM_BLOCK_RFC4_IV_OFFSET;
+		/* Chain to given list */
+		cc_add_buffer_entry(dev, sg_data,
+				    (areq_ctx->gen_ctx.iv_dma_addr + iv_ofs),
+				    iv_size_to_authenc, is_last,
+				    &areq_ctx->assoc.mlli_nents);
+		areq_ctx->assoc_buff_type = CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI;
+	}
+
+chain_iv_exit:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int cc_aead_chain_assoc(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata,
+			       struct aead_request *req,
+			       struct buffer_array *sg_data,
+			       bool is_last, bool do_chain)
+{
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	int rc = 0;
+	u32 mapped_nents = 0;
+	struct scatterlist *current_sg = req->src;
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	unsigned int sg_index = 0;
+	u32 size_of_assoc = req->assoclen;
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(drvdata);
+
+	if (areq_ctx->is_gcm4543)
+		size_of_assoc += crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+
+	if (!sg_data) {
+		rc = -EINVAL;
+		goto chain_assoc_exit;
+	}
+
+	if (req->assoclen == 0) {
+		areq_ctx->assoc_buff_type = CC_DMA_BUF_NULL;
+		areq_ctx->assoc.nents = 0;
+		areq_ctx->assoc.mlli_nents = 0;
+		dev_dbg(dev, "Chain assoc of length 0: buff_type=%s nents=%u\n",
+			cc_dma_buf_type(areq_ctx->assoc_buff_type),
+			areq_ctx->assoc.nents);
+		goto chain_assoc_exit;
+	}
+
+	//iterate over the sgl to see how many entries are for associated data
+	//it is assumed that if we reach here , the sgl is already mapped
+	sg_index = current_sg->length;
+	//the first entry in the scatter list contains all the associated data
+	if (sg_index > size_of_assoc) {
+		mapped_nents++;
+	} else {
+		while (sg_index <= size_of_assoc) {
+			current_sg = sg_next(current_sg);
+			/* if have reached the end of the sgl, then this is
+			 * unexpected
+			 */
+			if (!current_sg) {
+				dev_err(dev, "reached end of sg list. unexpected\n");
+				return -EINVAL;
+			}
+			sg_index += current_sg->length;
+			mapped_nents++;
+		}
+	}
+	if (mapped_nents > LLI_MAX_NUM_OF_ASSOC_DATA_ENTRIES) {
+		dev_err(dev, "Too many fragments. current %d max %d\n",
+			mapped_nents, LLI_MAX_NUM_OF_ASSOC_DATA_ENTRIES);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	areq_ctx->assoc.nents = mapped_nents;
+
+	/* in CCM case we have additional entry for
+	 * ccm header configurations
+	 */
+	if (areq_ctx->ccm_hdr_size != ccm_header_size_null) {
+		if ((mapped_nents + 1) > LLI_MAX_NUM_OF_ASSOC_DATA_ENTRIES) {
+			dev_err(dev, "CCM case.Too many fragments. Current %d max %d\n",
+				(areq_ctx->assoc.nents + 1),
+				LLI_MAX_NUM_OF_ASSOC_DATA_ENTRIES);
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto chain_assoc_exit;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (mapped_nents == 1 && areq_ctx->ccm_hdr_size == ccm_header_size_null)
+		areq_ctx->assoc_buff_type = CC_DMA_BUF_DLLI;
+	else
+		areq_ctx->assoc_buff_type = CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI;
+
+	if (do_chain || areq_ctx->assoc_buff_type == CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI) {
+		dev_dbg(dev, "Chain assoc: buff_type=%s nents=%u\n",
+			cc_dma_buf_type(areq_ctx->assoc_buff_type),
+			areq_ctx->assoc.nents);
+		cc_add_sg_entry(dev, sg_data, areq_ctx->assoc.nents, req->src,
+				req->assoclen, 0, is_last,
+				&areq_ctx->assoc.mlli_nents);
+		areq_ctx->assoc_buff_type = CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI;
+	}
+
+chain_assoc_exit:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void cc_prepare_aead_data_dlli(struct aead_request *req,
+				      u32 *src_last_bytes, u32 *dst_last_bytes)
+{
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	enum drv_crypto_direction direct = areq_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type;
+	unsigned int authsize = areq_ctx->req_authsize;
+
+	areq_ctx->is_icv_fragmented = false;
+	if (req->src == req->dst) {
+		/*INPLACE*/
+		areq_ctx->icv_dma_addr = sg_dma_address(areq_ctx->src_sgl) +
+			(*src_last_bytes - authsize);
+		areq_ctx->icv_virt_addr = sg_virt(areq_ctx->src_sgl) +
+			(*src_last_bytes - authsize);
+	} else if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) {
+		/*NON-INPLACE and DECRYPT*/
+		areq_ctx->icv_dma_addr = sg_dma_address(areq_ctx->src_sgl) +
+			(*src_last_bytes - authsize);
+		areq_ctx->icv_virt_addr = sg_virt(areq_ctx->src_sgl) +
+			(*src_last_bytes - authsize);
+	} else {
+		/*NON-INPLACE and ENCRYPT*/
+		areq_ctx->icv_dma_addr = sg_dma_address(areq_ctx->dst_sgl) +
+			(*dst_last_bytes - authsize);
+		areq_ctx->icv_virt_addr = sg_virt(areq_ctx->dst_sgl) +
+			(*dst_last_bytes - authsize);
+	}
+}
+
+static int cc_prepare_aead_data_mlli(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata,
+				     struct aead_request *req,
+				     struct buffer_array *sg_data,
+				     u32 *src_last_bytes, u32 *dst_last_bytes,
+				     bool is_last_table)
+{
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	enum drv_crypto_direction direct = areq_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type;
+	unsigned int authsize = areq_ctx->req_authsize;
+	int rc = 0, icv_nents;
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(drvdata);
+	struct scatterlist *sg;
+
+	if (req->src == req->dst) {
+		/*INPLACE*/
+		cc_add_sg_entry(dev, sg_data, areq_ctx->src.nents,
+				areq_ctx->src_sgl, areq_ctx->cryptlen,
+				areq_ctx->src_offset, is_last_table,
+				&areq_ctx->src.mlli_nents);
+
+		icv_nents = cc_get_aead_icv_nents(dev, areq_ctx->src_sgl,
+						  areq_ctx->src.nents,
+						  authsize, *src_last_bytes,
+						  &areq_ctx->is_icv_fragmented);
+		if (icv_nents < 0) {
+			rc = -ENOTSUPP;
+			goto prepare_data_mlli_exit;
+		}
+
+		if (areq_ctx->is_icv_fragmented) {
+			/* Backup happens only when ICV is fragmented, ICV
+			 * verification is made by CPU compare in order to
+			 * simplify MAC verification upon request completion
+			 */
+			if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) {
+				/* In coherent platforms (e.g. ACP)
+				 * already copying ICV for any
+				 * INPLACE-DECRYPT operation, hence
+				 * we must neglect this code.
+				 */
+				if (!drvdata->coherent)
+					cc_copy_mac(dev, req, CC_SG_TO_BUF);
+
+				areq_ctx->icv_virt_addr = areq_ctx->backup_mac;
+			} else {
+				areq_ctx->icv_virt_addr = areq_ctx->mac_buf;
+				areq_ctx->icv_dma_addr =
+					areq_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr;
+			}
+		} else { /* Contig. ICV */
+			sg = &areq_ctx->src_sgl[areq_ctx->src.nents - 1];
+			/*Should hanlde if the sg is not contig.*/
+			areq_ctx->icv_dma_addr = sg_dma_address(sg) +
+				(*src_last_bytes - authsize);
+			areq_ctx->icv_virt_addr = sg_virt(sg) +
+				(*src_last_bytes - authsize);
+		}
+
+	} else if (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) {
+		/*NON-INPLACE and DECRYPT*/
+		cc_add_sg_entry(dev, sg_data, areq_ctx->src.nents,
+				areq_ctx->src_sgl, areq_ctx->cryptlen,
+				areq_ctx->src_offset, is_last_table,
+				&areq_ctx->src.mlli_nents);
+		cc_add_sg_entry(dev, sg_data, areq_ctx->dst.nents,
+				areq_ctx->dst_sgl, areq_ctx->cryptlen,
+				areq_ctx->dst_offset, is_last_table,
+				&areq_ctx->dst.mlli_nents);
+
+		icv_nents = cc_get_aead_icv_nents(dev, areq_ctx->src_sgl,
+						  areq_ctx->src.nents,
+						  authsize, *src_last_bytes,
+						  &areq_ctx->is_icv_fragmented);
+		if (icv_nents < 0) {
+			rc = -ENOTSUPP;
+			goto prepare_data_mlli_exit;
+		}
+
+		/* Backup happens only when ICV is fragmented, ICV
+		 * verification is made by CPU compare in order to simplify
+		 * MAC verification upon request completion
+		 */
+		if (areq_ctx->is_icv_fragmented) {
+			cc_copy_mac(dev, req, CC_SG_TO_BUF);
+			areq_ctx->icv_virt_addr = areq_ctx->backup_mac;
+
+		} else { /* Contig. ICV */
+			sg = &areq_ctx->src_sgl[areq_ctx->src.nents - 1];
+			/*Should hanlde if the sg is not contig.*/
+			areq_ctx->icv_dma_addr = sg_dma_address(sg) +
+				(*src_last_bytes - authsize);
+			areq_ctx->icv_virt_addr = sg_virt(sg) +
+				(*src_last_bytes - authsize);
+		}
+
+	} else {
+		/*NON-INPLACE and ENCRYPT*/
+		cc_add_sg_entry(dev, sg_data, areq_ctx->dst.nents,
+				areq_ctx->dst_sgl, areq_ctx->cryptlen,
+				areq_ctx->dst_offset, is_last_table,
+				&areq_ctx->dst.mlli_nents);
+		cc_add_sg_entry(dev, sg_data, areq_ctx->src.nents,
+				areq_ctx->src_sgl, areq_ctx->cryptlen,
+				areq_ctx->src_offset, is_last_table,
+				&areq_ctx->src.mlli_nents);
+
+		icv_nents = cc_get_aead_icv_nents(dev, areq_ctx->dst_sgl,
+						  areq_ctx->dst.nents,
+						  authsize, *dst_last_bytes,
+						  &areq_ctx->is_icv_fragmented);
+		if (icv_nents < 0) {
+			rc = -ENOTSUPP;
+			goto prepare_data_mlli_exit;
+		}
+
+		if (!areq_ctx->is_icv_fragmented) {
+			sg = &areq_ctx->dst_sgl[areq_ctx->dst.nents - 1];
+			/* Contig. ICV */
+			areq_ctx->icv_dma_addr = sg_dma_address(sg) +
+				(*dst_last_bytes - authsize);
+			areq_ctx->icv_virt_addr = sg_virt(sg) +
+				(*dst_last_bytes - authsize);
+		} else {
+			areq_ctx->icv_dma_addr = areq_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr;
+			areq_ctx->icv_virt_addr = areq_ctx->mac_buf;
+		}
+	}
+
+prepare_data_mlli_exit:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static int cc_aead_chain_data(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata,
+			      struct aead_request *req,
+			      struct buffer_array *sg_data,
+			      bool is_last_table, bool do_chain)
+{
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(drvdata);
+	enum drv_crypto_direction direct = areq_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type;
+	unsigned int authsize = areq_ctx->req_authsize;
+	int src_last_bytes = 0, dst_last_bytes = 0;
+	int rc = 0;
+	u32 src_mapped_nents = 0, dst_mapped_nents = 0;
+	u32 offset = 0;
+	/* non-inplace mode */
+	unsigned int size_for_map = req->assoclen + req->cryptlen;
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	u32 sg_index = 0;
+	bool chained = false;
+	bool is_gcm4543 = areq_ctx->is_gcm4543;
+	u32 size_to_skip = req->assoclen;
+
+	if (is_gcm4543)
+		size_to_skip += crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+
+	offset = size_to_skip;
+
+	if (!sg_data)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	areq_ctx->src_sgl = req->src;
+	areq_ctx->dst_sgl = req->dst;
+
+	if (is_gcm4543)
+		size_for_map += crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+
+	size_for_map += (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ?
+			authsize : 0;
+	src_mapped_nents = cc_get_sgl_nents(dev, req->src, size_for_map,
+					    &src_last_bytes, &chained);
+	sg_index = areq_ctx->src_sgl->length;
+	//check where the data starts
+	while (sg_index <= size_to_skip) {
+		offset -= areq_ctx->src_sgl->length;
+		areq_ctx->src_sgl = sg_next(areq_ctx->src_sgl);
+		//if have reached the end of the sgl, then this is unexpected
+		if (!areq_ctx->src_sgl) {
+			dev_err(dev, "reached end of sg list. unexpected\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		sg_index += areq_ctx->src_sgl->length;
+		src_mapped_nents--;
+	}
+	if (src_mapped_nents > LLI_MAX_NUM_OF_DATA_ENTRIES) {
+		dev_err(dev, "Too many fragments. current %d max %d\n",
+			src_mapped_nents, LLI_MAX_NUM_OF_DATA_ENTRIES);
+			return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+	areq_ctx->src.nents = src_mapped_nents;
+
+	areq_ctx->src_offset = offset;
+
+	if (req->src != req->dst) {
+		size_for_map = req->assoclen + req->cryptlen;
+		size_for_map += (direct == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ?
+				authsize : 0;
+		if (is_gcm4543)
+			size_for_map += crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+
+		rc = cc_map_sg(dev, req->dst, size_for_map, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL,
+			       &areq_ctx->dst.nents,
+			       LLI_MAX_NUM_OF_DATA_ENTRIES, &dst_last_bytes,
+			       &dst_mapped_nents);
+		if (rc) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto chain_data_exit;
+		}
+	}
+
+	dst_mapped_nents = cc_get_sgl_nents(dev, req->dst, size_for_map,
+					    &dst_last_bytes, &chained);
+	sg_index = areq_ctx->dst_sgl->length;
+	offset = size_to_skip;
+
+	//check where the data starts
+	while (sg_index <= size_to_skip) {
+		offset -= areq_ctx->dst_sgl->length;
+		areq_ctx->dst_sgl = sg_next(areq_ctx->dst_sgl);
+		//if have reached the end of the sgl, then this is unexpected
+		if (!areq_ctx->dst_sgl) {
+			dev_err(dev, "reached end of sg list. unexpected\n");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+		sg_index += areq_ctx->dst_sgl->length;
+		dst_mapped_nents--;
+	}
+	if (dst_mapped_nents > LLI_MAX_NUM_OF_DATA_ENTRIES) {
+		dev_err(dev, "Too many fragments. current %d max %d\n",
+			dst_mapped_nents, LLI_MAX_NUM_OF_DATA_ENTRIES);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
+	areq_ctx->dst.nents = dst_mapped_nents;
+	areq_ctx->dst_offset = offset;
+	if (src_mapped_nents > 1 ||
+	    dst_mapped_nents  > 1 ||
+	    do_chain) {
+		areq_ctx->data_buff_type = CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI;
+		rc = cc_prepare_aead_data_mlli(drvdata, req, sg_data,
+					       &src_last_bytes,
+					       &dst_last_bytes, is_last_table);
+	} else {
+		areq_ctx->data_buff_type = CC_DMA_BUF_DLLI;
+		cc_prepare_aead_data_dlli(req, &src_last_bytes,
+					  &dst_last_bytes);
+	}
+
+chain_data_exit:
+	return rc;
+}
+
+static void cc_update_aead_mlli_nents(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata,
+				      struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	u32 curr_mlli_size = 0;
+
+	if (areq_ctx->assoc_buff_type == CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI) {
+		areq_ctx->assoc.sram_addr = drvdata->mlli_sram_addr;
+		curr_mlli_size = areq_ctx->assoc.mlli_nents *
+						LLI_ENTRY_BYTE_SIZE;
+	}
+
+	if (areq_ctx->data_buff_type == CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI) {
+		/*Inplace case dst nents equal to src nents*/
+		if (req->src == req->dst) {
+			areq_ctx->dst.mlli_nents = areq_ctx->src.mlli_nents;
+			areq_ctx->src.sram_addr = drvdata->mlli_sram_addr +
+								curr_mlli_size;
+			areq_ctx->dst.sram_addr = areq_ctx->src.sram_addr;
+			if (!areq_ctx->is_single_pass)
+				areq_ctx->assoc.mlli_nents +=
+					areq_ctx->src.mlli_nents;
+		} else {
+			if (areq_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type ==
+					DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT) {
+				areq_ctx->src.sram_addr =
+						drvdata->mlli_sram_addr +
+								curr_mlli_size;
+				areq_ctx->dst.sram_addr =
+						areq_ctx->src.sram_addr +
+						areq_ctx->src.mlli_nents *
+						LLI_ENTRY_BYTE_SIZE;
+				if (!areq_ctx->is_single_pass)
+					areq_ctx->assoc.mlli_nents +=
+						areq_ctx->src.mlli_nents;
+			} else {
+				areq_ctx->dst.sram_addr =
+						drvdata->mlli_sram_addr +
+								curr_mlli_size;
+				areq_ctx->src.sram_addr =
+						areq_ctx->dst.sram_addr +
+						areq_ctx->dst.mlli_nents *
+						LLI_ENTRY_BYTE_SIZE;
+				if (!areq_ctx->is_single_pass)
+					areq_ctx->assoc.mlli_nents +=
+						areq_ctx->dst.mlli_nents;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+}
+
+int cc_map_aead_request(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata, struct aead_request *req)
+{
+	struct aead_req_ctx *areq_ctx = aead_request_ctx(req);
+	struct mlli_params *mlli_params = &areq_ctx->mlli_params;
+	struct device *dev = drvdata_to_dev(drvdata);
+	struct buffer_array sg_data;
+	unsigned int authsize = areq_ctx->req_authsize;
+	struct buff_mgr_handle *buff_mgr = drvdata->buff_mgr_handle;
+	int rc = 0;
+	struct crypto_aead *tfm = crypto_aead_reqtfm(req);
+	bool is_gcm4543 = areq_ctx->is_gcm4543;
+	dma_addr_t dma_addr;
+	u32 mapped_nents = 0;
+	u32 dummy = 0; /*used for the assoc data fragments */
+	u32 size_to_map = 0;
+	gfp_t flags = cc_gfp_flags(&req->base);
+
+	mlli_params->curr_pool = NULL;
+	sg_data.num_of_buffers = 0;
+
+	/* copy mac to a temporary location to deal with possible
+	 * data memory overriding that caused by cache coherence problem.
+	 */
+	if (drvdata->coherent &&
+	    areq_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_DECRYPT &&
+	    req->src == req->dst)
+		cc_copy_mac(dev, req, CC_SG_TO_BUF);
+
+	/* cacluate the size for cipher remove ICV in decrypt*/
+	areq_ctx->cryptlen = (areq_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type ==
+				 DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT) ?
+				req->cryptlen :
+				(req->cryptlen - authsize);
+
+	dma_addr = dma_map_single(dev, areq_ctx->mac_buf, MAX_MAC_SIZE,
+				  DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+	if (dma_mapping_error(dev, dma_addr)) {
+		dev_err(dev, "Mapping mac_buf %u B at va=%pK for DMA failed\n",
+			MAX_MAC_SIZE, areq_ctx->mac_buf);
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto aead_map_failure;
+	}
+	areq_ctx->mac_buf_dma_addr = dma_addr;
+
+	if (areq_ctx->ccm_hdr_size != ccm_header_size_null) {
+		void *addr = areq_ctx->ccm_config + CCM_CTR_COUNT_0_OFFSET;
+
+		dma_addr = dma_map_single(dev, addr, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+					  DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+		if (dma_mapping_error(dev, dma_addr)) {
+			dev_err(dev, "Mapping mac_buf %u B at va=%pK for DMA failed\n",
+				AES_BLOCK_SIZE, addr);
+			areq_ctx->ccm_iv0_dma_addr = 0;
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto aead_map_failure;
+		}
+		areq_ctx->ccm_iv0_dma_addr = dma_addr;
+
+		if (cc_set_aead_conf_buf(dev, areq_ctx, areq_ctx->ccm_config,
+					 &sg_data, req->assoclen)) {
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto aead_map_failure;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (areq_ctx->cipher_mode == DRV_CIPHER_GCTR) {
+		dma_addr = dma_map_single(dev, areq_ctx->hkey, AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
+					  DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL);
+		if (dma_mapping_error(dev, dma_addr)) {
+			dev_err(dev, "Mapping hkey %u B at va=%pK for DMA failed\n",
+				AES_BLOCK_SIZE, areq_ctx->hkey);
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto aead_map_failure;
+		}
+		areq_ctx->hkey_dma_addr = dma_addr;
+
+		dma_addr = dma_map_single(dev, &areq_ctx->gcm_len_block,
+					  AES_BLOCK_SIZE, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+		if (dma_mapping_error(dev, dma_addr)) {
+			dev_err(dev, "Mapping gcm_len_block %u B at va=%pK for DMA failed\n",
+				AES_BLOCK_SIZE, &areq_ctx->gcm_len_block);
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto aead_map_failure;
+		}
+		areq_ctx->gcm_block_len_dma_addr = dma_addr;
+
+		dma_addr = dma_map_single(dev, areq_ctx->gcm_iv_inc1,
+					  AES_BLOCK_SIZE, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+		if (dma_mapping_error(dev, dma_addr)) {
+			dev_err(dev, "Mapping gcm_iv_inc1 %u B at va=%pK for DMA failed\n",
+				AES_BLOCK_SIZE, (areq_ctx->gcm_iv_inc1));
+			areq_ctx->gcm_iv_inc1_dma_addr = 0;
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto aead_map_failure;
+		}
+		areq_ctx->gcm_iv_inc1_dma_addr = dma_addr;
+
+		dma_addr = dma_map_single(dev, areq_ctx->gcm_iv_inc2,
+					  AES_BLOCK_SIZE, DMA_TO_DEVICE);
+
+		if (dma_mapping_error(dev, dma_addr)) {
+			dev_err(dev, "Mapping gcm_iv_inc2 %u B at va=%pK for DMA failed\n",
+				AES_BLOCK_SIZE, (areq_ctx->gcm_iv_inc2));
+			areq_ctx->gcm_iv_inc2_dma_addr = 0;
+			rc = -ENOMEM;
+			goto aead_map_failure;
+		}
+		areq_ctx->gcm_iv_inc2_dma_addr = dma_addr;
+	}
+
+	size_to_map = req->cryptlen + req->assoclen;
+	if (areq_ctx->gen_ctx.op_type == DRV_CRYPTO_DIRECTION_ENCRYPT)
+		size_to_map += authsize;
+
+	if (is_gcm4543)
+		size_to_map += crypto_aead_ivsize(tfm);
+	rc = cc_map_sg(dev, req->src, size_to_map, DMA_BIDIRECTIONAL,
+		       &areq_ctx->src.nents,
+		       (LLI_MAX_NUM_OF_ASSOC_DATA_ENTRIES +
+			LLI_MAX_NUM_OF_DATA_ENTRIES),
+		       &dummy, &mapped_nents);
+	if (rc) {
+		rc = -ENOMEM;
+		goto aead_map_failure;
+	}
+
+	if (areq_ctx->is_single_pass) {
+		/*
+		 * Create MLLI table for:
+		 *   (1) Assoc. data
+		 *   (2) Src/Dst SGLs
+		 *   Note: IV is contg. buffer (not an SGL)
+		 */
+		rc = cc_aead_chain_assoc(drvdata, req, &sg_data, true, false);
+		if (rc)
+			goto aead_map_failure;
+		rc = cc_aead_chain_iv(drvdata, req, &sg_data, true, false);
+		if (rc)
+			goto aead_map_failure;
+		rc = cc_aead_chain_data(drvdata, req, &sg_data, true, false);
+		if (rc)
+			goto aead_map_failure;
+	} else { /* DOUBLE-PASS flow */
+		/*
+		 * Prepare MLLI table(s) in this order:
+		 *
+		 * If ENCRYPT/DECRYPT (inplace):
+		 *   (1) MLLI table for assoc
+		 *   (2) IV entry (chained right after end of assoc)
+		 *   (3) MLLI for src/dst (inplace operation)
+		 *
+		 * If ENCRYPT (non-inplace)
+		 *   (1) MLLI table for assoc
+		 *   (2) IV entry (chained right after end of assoc)
+		 *   (3) MLLI for dst
+		 *   (4) MLLI for src
+		 *
+		 * If DECRYPT (non-inplace)
+		 *   (1) MLLI table for assoc
+		 *   (2) IV entry (chained right after end of assoc)
+		 *   (3) MLLI for src
+		 *   (4) MLLI for dst
+		 */
+		rc = cc_aead_chain_assoc(drvdata, req, &sg_data, false, true);
+		if (rc)
+			goto aead_map_failure;
+		rc = cc_aead_chain_iv(drvdata, req, &sg_data, false, true);
+		if (rc)
+			goto aead_map_failure;
+		rc = cc_aead_chain_data(drvdata, req, &sg_data, true, true);
+		if (rc)
+			goto aead_map_failure;
+	}
+
+	/* Mlli support -start building the MLLI according to the above
+	 * results
+	 */
+	if (areq_ctx->assoc_buff_type == CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI ||
+	    areq_ctx->data_buff_type == CC_DMA_BUF_MLLI) {
+		mlli_params->curr_pool = buff_mgr->mlli_buffs_pool;
+		rc = cc_generate_mlli(dev, &sg_data, mlli_params, flags);
+		if (rc)
+			goto aead_map_failure;
+
+		cc_update_aead_mlli_nents(drvdata, req);
+		dev_dbg(dev, "assoc params mn %d\n",
+			areq_ctx->assoc.mlli_nents);
+		dev_dbg(dev, "src params mn %d\n", areq_ctx->src.mlli_nents);
+		dev_dbg(dev, "dst params mn %d\n", areq_ctx->dst.mlli_nents);
+	}
+	return 0;
+
+aead_map_failure:
+	cc_unmap_aead_request(dev, req);
+	return rc;
+}
+
 int cc_map_hash_request_final(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata, void *ctx,
 			      struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes,
 			      bool do_update, gfp_t flags)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.h b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.h
index ff4a5ec..99b752a 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_buffer_mgr.h
@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@ void cc_unmap_blkcipher_request(struct device *dev, void *ctx,
 				struct scatterlist *src,
 				struct scatterlist *dst);
 
+int cc_map_aead_request(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata, struct aead_request *req);
+
+void cc_unmap_aead_request(struct device *dev, struct aead_request *req);
+
 int cc_map_hash_request_final(struct cc_drvdata *drvdata, void *ctx,
 			      struct scatterlist *src, unsigned int nbytes,
 			      bool do_update, gfp_t flags);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_driver.c b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_driver.c
index bd11693..31140e3 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_driver.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_driver.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include "cc_buffer_mgr.h"
 #include "cc_debugfs.h"
 #include "cc_cipher.h"
+#include "cc_aead.h"
 #include "cc_hash.h"
 #include "cc_ivgen.h"
 #include "cc_sram_mgr.h"
@@ -295,8 +296,16 @@ static int init_cc_resources(struct platform_device *plat_dev)
 		goto post_cipher_err;
 	}
 
+	rc = cc_aead_alloc(new_drvdata);
+	if (rc) {
+		dev_err(dev, "cc_aead_alloc failed\n");
+		goto post_hash_err;
+	}
+
 	return 0;
 
+post_hash_err:
+	cc_hash_free(new_drvdata);
 post_cipher_err:
 	cc_cipher_free(new_drvdata);
 post_ivgen_err:
@@ -329,6 +338,7 @@ static void cleanup_cc_resources(struct platform_device *plat_dev)
 	struct cc_drvdata *drvdata =
 		(struct cc_drvdata *)platform_get_drvdata(plat_dev);
 
+	cc_aead_free(drvdata);
 	cc_hash_free(drvdata);
 	cc_cipher_free(drvdata);
 	cc_ivgen_fini(drvdata);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_driver.h b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_driver.h
index b772262..ab9a66f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_driver.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/ccree/cc_driver.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
 #include <crypto/aes.h>
 #include <crypto/sha.h>
+#include <crypto/aead.h>
 #include <crypto/authenc.h>
 #include <crypto/hash.h>
 #include <linux/version.h>
@@ -111,6 +112,7 @@ struct cc_drvdata {
 	cc_sram_addr_t mlli_sram_addr;
 	void *buff_mgr_handle;
 	void *hash_handle;
+	void *aead_handle;
 	void *blkcipher_handle;
 	void *request_mgr_handle;
 	void *ivgen_handle;
@@ -127,6 +129,7 @@ struct cc_crypto_alg {
 	int auth_mode;
 	struct cc_drvdata *drvdata;
 	struct crypto_alg crypto_alg;
+	struct aead_alg aead_alg;
 };
 
 struct cc_alg_template {
@@ -136,6 +139,7 @@ struct cc_alg_template {
 	u32 type;
 	union {
 		struct ablkcipher_alg ablkcipher;
+		struct aead_alg aead;
 		struct blkcipher_alg blkcipher;
 		struct cipher_alg cipher;
 		struct compress_alg compress;
-- 
2.7.4



More information about the devel mailing list